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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Maize is Malawi’s main staple food. It contributes roughly 54 percent of
households’ caloric intake (Minot, 2010). Consequently, attainment of food security in
Malawi heavily relies on the availability and accessibility of maize. Therefore, the
importance of maize to the Malawian economy is the center of agriculture policy.
Malawi agriculture policy outlines strategies to achieve availability and accessibility of
maize. Attainment of these policy objectives may be hindered by unstable maize
quantities and prices among others. According to Chapoto and Jayne (2009) on average
the intra-annual high to low price ratio is 2.45 in Malawi.
Maize price instability affects attainment of food security objectives in two ways.
First, it does not provide incentives for maize production when prices fall below the cost
of production. Secondly, maize purchasers’ welfare is negatively affected when prices are
high during periods of short supply (Manda, 2010). These two effects result into the
unreliability of the markets to achieving food security objectives due to exposure to
maize price risk.
To address the potential problem of unstable maize prices, the Government of
Malawi has implemented a number of interventions in maize markets. Notable
interventions include: maize export bans, implementation of a price band policy,
1

minimum producer prices and maintenance of strategic grain reserves which is released
when there are localized disasters and to lower consumer maize prices.
Most of the Malawi Government’s interventions in the maize market (maize
purchases and sales) has been through government owned companies, Agricultural
Development and Marketing Cooperation (ADMARC) and the National Food Reserve
Agency (NFRA). In the case of ADMARC, the major problems encountered have been
delays in starting purchasing maize and a binding budget constraint in the purchase of
maize. The later problem results in ADMARC running out of maize stock during the lean
season (period of no farm production) (Jayne et. al. 2010; USAID, 2013).
There have been diverse views on the strategies used by the Malawi Government
to address the problem of unstable maize prices. Rubey (2004) argued that it is the
continued government intervention in the maize markets that contribute to maize price
volatility. Other studies have indicated that the major cause of maize price volatility is
the removal of price controls and lack of government intervention in the maize market
(Devereux, 2002 and Drimie, 2004).
There are a number of supportive explanations to the price volatility arguments by
Rubey (2004). One of the explanations is inadequate capacity by the government to
stabilize maize prices. In most cases when the Malawi Government intervenes in the
maize market, it does not have enough maize stock to sustain its intervention. In such
situations consumers face low prices when government maize stock is available and
higher prices when government stock runs out.
In light of this, various studies have suggested different courses of action to
address the problem of maize price volatility. Byerlee et al. (2006) argue that a market
2

led approach without government intervention would be the most effective method in
dealing with the problem of unstable maize prices. This is mainly because food
consumption patterns and production have diversified overtime in eastern and southern
African countries. In addition, there are low returns associated with price stabilization
programs compared to other investments like agricultural research, education and roads.
On the other hand, Poulton et al. (2006) argue that credible state intervention is necessary
to address the problem of maize price volatility in east and southern African countries.
Their argument is based on three major reasons and these are: (i) If government does not
intervene, the probability of sufficient inter-annual storage not occurring is high because
inventory credit seldom provides for inter-annual storage. In addition, there is high
uncertainty arising from inter-annual price movement and costs involved in inter-annual
storage; (ii) There are limits on how far international trade in staple food would stabilize
food prices. This is mainly dependent on transport costs and; (iii) Complete market
liberalization would not be politically credible especially in surplus or deficit years.
Specific Problem
High and volatile prices reduce welfare in absence of efficient markets. Without
efficient markets, this leaves the government in a food policy dilemma on how best to
alleviate the problem of intra-seasonal (within year seasons) instability of maize prices.
The current maize market price stabilization initiatives are implemented amidst
numerous challenges. These challenges are: (i) Delays by ADMARC to start purchasing
maize at the beginning of the harvest season results in some farmers being engaged in
distress maize sales due to immediate cash needs; (ii) Inadequate stocks held by
ADMARC for sale during the lean season result into few poor households having access
3

to subsidized maize; (iii) High grain storage costs by the NFRA results in the company
storing limited maize volume; and (iv) Inadequate financial resources by the government
for implementation of maize price stabilizations programs.
Despite a common belief that maize price volatility is an important issue, there
are diverging views on how best to address the problem. For instance, Rubey (2004)
identifies continued government intervention (purchase and selling of subsidized maize)
in the maize market as a possible source of price volatility. Hence markets without
government interventions are viewed as a solution to price volatility. Others (e.g. Poulton
et al. (2006)) advocate for government interventions in the maize market to deal with
price volatility. However, it is not known whether government interventions indeed
contribute to high maize price volatility.
This, therefore, calls for the need to gain a better understanding into the
implications of timing of government interventions (maize purchases and sells) on maize
price stability. To achieve this goal the impacts of alternative timing strategies of
government interventions (buying and selling of maize) on maize price stability are
tested.
A clear understanding of impacts of alternative timing strategies for interventions
in the maize market would allow the government to implement a food security policy in
an efficient manner. In turn, this will ensure that both maize producers and consumers
face maize prices that are relatively stable and predictable.

4

Objectives
The main objective of the study is to analyze the effectiveness of different market
intervention timings on (i) intra-seasonal maize price stability and (ii) welfare in a
laboratory setting. Specifically, the study aims to:
1. Evaluate the economic efficiency of the Malawi Government’s current policy
to address intra-seasonal price/quantity instability
2. Evaluate alternative government market intervention timing strategies on
intra-seasonal maize price volatility
i. Change in the commodity purchasing period
ii. Privatization
Contribution to Scientific Literature
The contribution of this study to scientific literature is twofold. First, the study
introduces government market timing intervention on intra-seasonal price/quantity
volatility. Secondly, the study expands the existing storage modeling literature in that the
study identifies the strategic behavior between trading intermediary and storage in a
structural market setting. More specifically, the study revives the use of game theoretic
approach in analyzing the problem of agricultural price stabilization policy. Only loosely
related theories (i.e. Arvan, 1985; Anton and Das Varma, 2005) and few laboratory
experiments (i.e Miller et al., 1977; Plot and Uhl, 1981) exist to date.

5

CHAPTER II
A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND MAIZE
MARKETING

After independence, the Malawi government implemented a number of
interventions in the maize sector. Areas of intervention included maize pricing and
marketing (Chirwa, 2000). In maize marketing, the government licensed grain traders
but set minimum and ceiling prices for maize. ADMARC, a government owned
company, maintained the minimum and ceiling prices.
In response to the 1979-80 economic crises (mainly due to increase in world oil
prices and the Mozambique war) the Malawi Government adopted Structural Adjustment
Programs (SAPs). In 1981 SAPs were financed by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) with the aim of improving performance of the economy (Chirwa et
al, 2008). According to Chirwa (2000), the major justification for SAPs was that state
interventions in marketing, pricing and subsidies make agriculture inefficient in
developing countries.
Following the adoption of SAPs, a number of government reforms were made in
the agriculture sector from 1981 to around early 2000’s. The reforms included upward
adjustment of ADMARC’s producer prices; partial removal of subsidies on fertilizer;
restructuring of ADMARC to focus on agricultural related enterprises (i.e. buying farm
produce); and removal of regulations (licensing) on produce and input traders (Chirwa et
6

al, 2005). In addition, ADMARC closed its markets that could not attain a 60 ton output
(Chirwa, 2008). The underlying assumption was that the private sector marketing
activities would enter areas where ADMARC had closed its markets. Unfortunately this
assumption did not hold as private traders did not take over ADMARC’s past marketing
activities in some remote areas.
Maize Marketing in Malawi
Maize Marketing Seasons and Market Participants
Maize in Malawi is traded at four major places namely farm gate, local markets,
district council, and urban markets. According to confidential interviews with members
of the Grain Traders Association of Malawi, it is estimated that approximately 300,000 to
400,000 metric tons of maize is traded in the domestic market annually. On the other
hand, Jayne et al. (2010) estimate that in a good year roughly 450,000 metric tons from
smallholder farmers is marketed, 400,000 metric tons in an average year and 200,000
metric tons in a bad year. Maize traders are classified into three categories based on
volumes of maize traded. Two versions of the classification system exist (both current
and by Grain Traders’ Association). According to the first version, these categories are
small traders (handle < 50 metric tons), medium traders ( 50 £ handle < 1,000 metric
tons) and large traders (handle ³ 1,000 metric tons). The second version’s categories are
vendors (handle between 10 kilograms and 50 kilograms), small traders (handle < 1,000
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metric tons) and large traders (handle ³ 1,000 metric tons). Both classifications are based
on Grain Traders Association of Malawi classification system1.
According to Jayne et al. (2010) maize marketing in Malawi is seasonal and can
be divided into four seasons. These seasons are post-harvest (April and May), entrance of
ADMARC (June – August), periods of no farm production (September to November, and
December to March).
April to May Marketing Season
In the first season (April and May), producer prices are normally very low
compared to other times of the year. Contributing factors to the low prices include
increased supply of rain-fed maize, high moisture content of the maize, immediate cash
needs by farmers to meet their basic needs and repay debts, and the absence of floor
prices (Jayne et al, 2010). During this phase of maize marketing, smallholder farmers
primarily sell their maize to rural consumers, small-scale traders and medium-scale
traders.
The major buyers in rural maize markets during this period include buying agents
for large companies, itinerant (mobile) traders, local buyers and small scale traders using
bicycles. Transactions are negotiated. The independent buyers assemble maize for resale
to processors and large traders. Competition is considered to be the highest among traders
during this season. However, farmers receive different prices depending on their
bargaining ability. It is not known how much maize passes through each of these
channels (Jayne et al, 2010). No studies have been conducted to quantify the percentage

1
These definitions were provided by two different Grain Traders Association officials as there is
no standard definition.
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of smallholder farmer production that would have been sold to traders by the time
ADMARC starts buying maize.
June to August Marketing Season
Entrance of ADMARC into the market during this period causes maize prices to
increase as traders compete against ADMARC. In this period, it is argued by farmers
that private traders offer higher prices than ADMARC though sometimes ADMARC
offers higher prices compared to traders (Jayne et al, 2010). In places where ADMARC
markets are closed, farmers typically do not sell their maize to ADMARC due to
transportation costs.
According to Jayne et al. (2010), during this period most farmers that have stored
their maize also begin selling in the market. This result in increased volume of maize,
though rural demand for maize is quite low.
September to November Marketing Season
During this period, most of the assemblers’ warehouses reach capacity and begin
reducing their maize purchases. Farmers continue to sell some of their maize to
assemblers who sell to private traders or ADMARC. Demand for maize in rural areas
starts increasing, and is met through informal household exchange and purchases from
small-scale traders.
December to March Marketing Season
During this period, most farmers will have sold most of their maize. Most of the
country’s maize demand during this period is met either through wholesalers that bought
maize during the year and also imports by traders from other countries like Mozambique,
9

Tanzania, and Zambia. Some of the farmers that still have maize mostly sell it in small
quantities to households.
Interaction of Market Participants in the Maize Market
The diagram below, adapted from Jayne et al. (2010), presents the maize trade
flows among the various participants in the Malawi maize market. In addition, the
diagram highlights the main participants in the marketing channel in the four maize
marketing seasons discussed above.

Figure 2.1

Linkage of Marketing Channels

Source: Jayne et al. (2010).
Maize Geographic Markets
Maize purchased from farmers in rural areas by small-assemblers and vendors is
moved to trading centers in districts. From these trading centers, maize is then sold to
consumers for consumption and to medium and large scale traders. Traders may export
10

maize to neighboring countries provided they have an export license from Ministry of
Industry and Trade, and there is no ban on maize exports. There also exists some
informal cross border trade, mostly in districts bordering neighboring countries. In most
cases, large scale traders operate throughout the country. Medium scale traders operate
in localized markets.
The map below (Figure 2.2) shows maize trade flows from areas of production to
some major marketing points.

Figure 2.2

Map of Malawi showing major maize producing areas and market points

Source: FEWSNET (Unknown)
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Current Malawi Government Policies on Maize Prices
The long term development strategy for Malawi is the Malawi Vision 2020. To
achieve this, the Malawi government is currently implementing the medium term
development strategy called Malawi Growth and Development Strategy II (MGDS II).
The strategy’s goal on food security is to ensure continued availability of food to
Malawians at affordable prices. One of MGDSII activities to achieve the goal is
implementation of policies sustaining availability and access to food.
To operationalize the MGDSII goals in the agriculture sector, the agriculture
sector investment plan called Agriculture Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp) was
developed. Among others, the ASWAp emphasizes the introduction of a food
stabilization mechanism by improving management of markets and climatic risks that
create the food gap (GoM, 2010).
In line with the above, the government of Malawi implements a number of maize
market interventions. These interventions include (i) Management and maintenance of
the Strategic Grain Reserves (SGR), (ii) Implementation of minimum producer prices,
(iii) Sale of subsidized maize to consumers and (iv) Maize export bans.
Even though the Malawi Government implements all these interventions in the
Maize market, there is no official maize price stabilization policy in Malawi. According
to interviews with government officials the sale of subsidized maize is based on the
government’s belief that if ADMARC floods the market with maize sold to households,
the country experiences relatively stable maize prices in a year.

12

Management and Maintenance of the Strategic Grain Reserves (SGR)
The Malawi Government manages and maintains maize strategic grain reserves
through the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA), a statutory corporation. NFRA
holds physical grain stocks and funds. These stocks and funds are used in maize markets
to mitigate the negative effects of market failure due to the private sector’s failure to
respond to market signals. Private firms fail to respond to market signals because of
inadequate storage capacity coupled with poor road networks in remote areas. Poulton et
al. (2006) and Manda (2010) identify a number of factors constraining development of
private firms’ storage capacity. These include (i) government’s unpredictable and
politically driven release of strategic maize into the market as well as maize importation
(ii) unpredictability of government regulations on maize trade and (iii) poor crop
production estimates and forecasts. For example sometimes crop estimates may indicate
that there is a deficit when there is a surplus. All these are a source of potential risks to
temporal arbitrage.
One of the strategic objectives of NFRA involves intervening in grain market to
stabilize it. According to confidential interviews with Department of Agricultural
Planning Services, Food Security Unit Officers, the maize strategic grain reserve has
three components. These are humanitarian maize, carryover maize stock and commercial
maize. However, interviews with the NFRA Chief Executive Officer reveal that the
strategic grain reserve comprises humanitarian maize only.
The humanitarian maize of the SGR is aimed at ensuring that households that
have lost their food entitlements through localized disasters have access to food.
Humanitarian (relief) maize is freely distributed by WFP and/or the Department of
13

Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA) to households/population that does not have the
financial capacity to purchase maize.
The Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) report, produced
annually forms the base for the planning of humanitarian maize. The MVAC report
provides information on number of households/population expected to miss food
entitlements.
The maize tonnage kept for humanitarian purposes varies from year to year
depending on size of the population expected to miss food entitlements. According to
interviews with government officials and NFRA officials, the NFRA can keep a
maximum of 75 thousand metric tons of maize for humanitarian purposes.
According to government officials, carry over stock is meant for providing a
bridge between a good and a bad harvest. This stock cushions the country against shocks
whilst the government is in the process of importing maize. Recommended maize volume
for carry over purposes is 60 thousand metric tons.
Commercial maize is meant for social marketing purposes. This maize is sold at
subsidized prices during the period of no farm production to stabilize maize prices.
Acquisition of SGR maize
NFRA operates on a balanced reserve basis. As such, NFRA’s maize
procurements are intended to equal maize releases. NFRA purchases maize through the
tender process (sealed bidding) in accordance with the Republic of Malawi procurement
procedures. Occasionally, development partners assist in the procurement of SGR maize
by funding NFRA to purchase maize or actual sourcing of maize stocks.
14

Implementation of minimum maize producer prices and sale of subsidized maize
The government of Malawi implements the minimum producer price policy and
sells subsidized maize during the lean season. The rationale for minimum maize producer
prices is to keep surplus maize producers in production by making it profitable. Whereas
the objective of selling subsidized maize to consumers is to make maize affordable to the
poor who cannot afford to buy maize.
Even though the government implements the minimum price policy in maize, it is
not binding to private traders. According to FEWSNET (2011) farm gate minimum prices
in Malawi are rarely enforced. In the lean season ADMARC releases subsidized maize at
prices discussed with the government.
In the sale of subsidized maize to consumers, ADMARC submits a request to the
Strategic Grain Reserve and Commercial Maize Committee for release of maize in the
SGR for lean season. This request mainly occurs when ADMARC runs out of stock.
During this process, ADMARC, or any other institution asking for a drawdown, has to
make a commitment to replenish the exact amount of maize released.
Under this arrangement, ADMARC allocates the released maize to hot spot (low
levels of maize production) areas as per the MVAC report. This is done to ensure that
households/the population that cannot afford to get maize in the market do not miss their
food entitlements. In this way, the population of food insecure households is reduced.
ADMARC and NFRA market operations in stabilizing maize prices
At present ADMARC has more than 700 operational markets in the country with
nine (9) major depots having a storage capacity of 20,000 metric tons each. ADMARC’s
market channel operates in parallel to the private sector’s (Myers, 2013). The main maize
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marketing activities of the company include: buying maize from both smallholder
farmers and traders during the harvest season, storing then selling staple maize in the
country through its vast market network. ADMARC’s involvement in the maize market is
from a social marketing perspective.
According to Myers (2013) the prices at which ADMARC purchases and sells
maize are set based on discussions with the government. ADMARC’s operations are
subsidized through transfers from the treasury (Myers, 2013). From confidential
interviews with one of ADMARC’s Director of Operations, ADMARC was allocated
MWK 1.3 billion for maize purchases in 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 respectively. In the
2012/13 season, it is estimated that ADMARC had purchased 18,000 metric tons of
maize.
The annual volumes of ADMARC domestic maize purchases has varied over time
(1998- 2012). In some years ADMARC has purchased as little as no maize and in some
years purchased over 50,000 metric tons (Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1

Annual maize production, exports, imports, ADMARC domestic maize
purchases and mean retail prices

Mean retail maize
price after harvest
ADMARC
Value of (real Mk/kg,
Production Exports Imports Domestic
ADMARC October.2011=100)
Year
(Metric
(Metric (Metric Purchases
Purchases Harvest Lean
Tons)
Tons)
Tons)
(Metric
(K’000) Season
Season
Tons)
(May-Oct.)(Nov.April)
1998
1,772,392
52 319,378
57,896
196,532
N/A
N/A
1999
2,479,406
90
28,163
198,021
131,773
N/A
N/A
2000
2,501,311 11,000
7,879
0
0
20.19
26.59
2001
1,713,064
9,879
9,326
2,890
16,878
41.6
84.75
2002
1,556,975
1,644 348,365
0
0
48.05
61.34
2003
1,983,440 54,604
61,836
0
0
35.58
59.53
2004
1,608,349 12,607
54,300
7,000
92
48.03
57.22
2005
1,225,234
467 113,300
9,097
215
70.24
129.76
2006
2,611,486
1,160
55,808
75,622
15,124
65.94
66.51
2007
3,226,418 391,255
20,180
32,728
597,494
56.5
113.23
2008
2,634,701 21,438
28,176
69,485 3,080,552
159.34
209.26
2009
3,582,502
3,665
54,416
44,268 2,262,516
123.42
144.77
2010
3,419,409
7,841
15,395
45,248 1,808,305
104.03
102.78
2011
3,699,147 357,302
6,106
17,420
609,700
N/A
N/A
2012
N/A
N/A
N/A
13,202
N/A
N/A
N/A
Sources: FAO Data Base, National Statistical Office (2012) and Gilbert et al. (2013)

According to confidential interviews with ADMARC’s Director of Operations,
ADMARC’s maize sales average between 50,000 to 80,000 metric tons. This constitutes
about 20% of the total maize market share according to the Grain Traders Association of
Malawi. The 20% percent is found by dividing 80,000 metric tons (highest ADMARC
sales volume reported by both ADMARC officials and Grain Traders Association) with
400,000 metric tons believed to be the volume of smallholder farmer maize marketed in
the domestic market in an average year.
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NFRA has a total storage capacity of 340,000 metric tons. 240,000 metric tons is
in the form of silos and 100,000 metric tons is in warehouses. Out of the 240,000 metric
tons in silos, 180,000 metric tons are located in Lilongwe and the remaining 60,000
metric tons are located in Luchenza (in Thyolo), Mangochi and Mzuzu. Each of the last
three areas has a storage capacity of 20,000 metric tons. The 100,000 metric tons space
in warehouses is offered for rent for private storage purposes.
Maize procurement at NFRA is through floating tenders (invitation for bids to
supply maize). Once the tenders are floated in the press, private traders submit their bids
to NFRA. In the event that the domestic market cannot satisfy NFRA’s maize demand,
international tenders are floated. In line with the Republic of Malawi procurement act
and procedures, NFRA offers maize supply contracts to successful private traders.
NFRA’s purchases vary from year to year depending on how much maize was
drawn down from the silos. This is because NFRA operates on a grain in grain out
principle. Maize releases from NFRA are based on drawdown authorization by the
Strategic Grain Reserve and Commercial Maize Committee. During the authorization
process, the party requesting for a draw down has to commit to replenish the exact
amount of maize it has requested to drawdown. Replenishment is mainly in kind.
Through the above arrangement, ADMARC can request for SGR drawdown for
commercial (social marketing) purposes2. Once the authorization has been granted,
ADMARC is supposed to replenish the silos as per the authorization conditions. This
creates the link between ADMARC and NFRA indicated in Figure 2.1. It’s not

This happens when the government uses ADMARC to ensure that poor households that can
afford to purchase maize in the markets in hotspot areas have access to maize so that they do not fall into
the category of food insecure households.
2
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guaranteed that when ADMARC submits this request it will always be granted the
drawdown authorization. Though not routine, sometimes NFRA may release maize from
its silos into the market through private traders.
Among the most common drawdowns include government programs responding
to natural disasters such as floods, sporadic dry spells and other larger natural disasters.
In this way NFRA indirectly contributes to stabilizing maize supply and subsequent
consumer prices.
Challenges Encountered in Implementing Maize Market Interventions
As discussed earlier on in this chapter, the government’s minimum prices are not
binding to private traders. Thus the maize price farmers’ face depends on the trader’s
pricing competition. Entry of ADMARC in the market creates and /or increases
competition among traders hence resulting in higher prices for farmers. This role of
ADMARC in the market is constrained by delayed funding for the company to start
buying maize in the market and also limited financial resources to operate in the maize
market (FEWSNET, 2013).
In terms of selling subsidized maize in the lean season, ADMARC has failed to
perform this role due to inadequate maize stocks available for sale (USAID, 2013). The
situation is compounded by ADMARC’s in-ability to distinguish between private traders
and households. Additionally, the budget constraint is also a major challenge to
implementation of market stabilization activities by NFRA in addition to delayed funding
of the agency by the government.
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Maize Export Ban
Due to the food crisis that Malawi experienced in 2001/2002, the government
instituted an export ban on maize and maize products. The export ban was temporarily
lifted from 1st March to 30th April, 2007(Government of Malawi, 2008). During this
period, the Malawi government issued export licenses to only 15 traders to export 80,000
metric tons of carry over stock from the 2005/2006 season.
In addition, the Malawi government, via NFRA, exported 366,306 metric tons of
maize produced in the 2006/2007 season to Zimbabwe. Private traders had exported
approximately 34,000 metric tons of the 2006/2007 harvest to Zimbabwe through the
World Food Program (Government of Malawi, 2008).
According to confidential interviews conducted with government officials, since
April, 2007 the maize export ban has never been lifted. The government periodically
issues a press release to remind the general public on the status of the export ban.
According to Grain Traders Association of Malawi, traders used to negotiate with the
government to export maize, but since 2014 this was not possible.
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CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews theoretical, empirical and experimental literature on price
stabilization as well as private storage. The first section reviews theories on price
stabilization. The subsequent sections review empirical literature on price stabilization
and private storage; classical agricultural economics storage model theory; strategic
storage models; and experimental literature on government market interventions in
stabilizing prices.
Structural price stabilization theories
The earliest price stabilization literature reviewed herein was developed by
Massell (1969). In his work, Massell developed a theory for analyzing the effects on
expected consumer and producer surplus of price stabilization programs that use buffer
stocks. The theory assumes perfectly competitive producers and consumers who are
indifferent to risk. Further, Massell assumes exogenous shocks in either supply or
demand or both as the only source of price fluctuations. The model predicts that gains
from price stabilization are greater when the variances in quantities supplied and
demanded are high and when both supply and demand are price elastic. When variance in
quantity demanded is larger than quantity supplied and demand is more elastic than
supply, then a consumer is likely to gain from price stabilization than producers. If there
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is zero variance in supply, consumers cannot lose from a price stabilization program.
Consumers are most likely to gain from a stabilization program if the covariance between
individual and market quantity demanded is large and also if individual demand is steeper
than market demand and supply.
Turnvosky (1976) later extends the work of Massell (1969) by assuming that
disturbances in supply and demand are multiplicative (due to non-linear supply and
demand as well as randomness in elasticity of demand and supply). The theory by
Turnvosky, postulates that the impact of price stabilization schemes on either producers
or consumers do not depend on the source of instability in prices but only on the elasticity
of supply and demand. Producers gain from price stabilization programs if supply is
inelastic and demand is elastic. Consumers gain from price stabilization if demand is
inelastic and supply is elastic. Thus the underlying nature of disturbances is critical in
assessing the desirability of stabilization programs.
Newbery and Stiglitz (1979) build on the work by Massell (1969) and Turnvosky
(1976) by analyzing long and short run effects of price stabilization programs. In
addition, they also focus on the impact of risk aversion and supply elasticity on
distribution of benefits from stabilization programs. Newbery and Stiglitz developed a
theory of partial price stabilization for cases where the mean supply does not change. The
theory predicts that the impact of price stabilization on identical producers is equivalent
to the simple positive fraction of elasticity of demand divided by the sum of the elasticity
of demand and supply before an adjustment in supply. The fraction is a function of the
elasticity of supply and demand. The theory assumes that risk is multiplicative (random
weather affects both farm production and income differently across years) and that
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demand and marginal utility have constant elasticity. In a more general case, the short
and long run impacts of partial price stabilization differ both qualitatively and
quantitatively. The theory suggests that assessing the desirability of a storage program i.e.
buffer stock would be a daunting task if the elasticity of demand and supply are
unknown.
Malan (2013) builds on Newbery and Stiglitz’s (1979) work by developing a
partial price stabilization model. According to the theory, price inelasticity of demand
causes price volatility. With inelastic demand, small changes in quantity supplied (from
either exogenous or endogenous causes) result in higher prices. The theory also predicts
that a buffer stock program that strategically uses inventory by stocking in a commodity
during low prices periods and stocking it out in high prices periods alters the price
distribution. Its effect on average price is equivalent to a buffer stock program that does
not strategically use inventory, but reduces price variability significantly.
Deviating from the three previous studies, Newbery (1989) concentrates on
developing a theory for food price stabilization. Newbery assumes that a country is a net
importer of grain; grain is readily available during harvest and becomes increasingly
scarce after harvest to meet demand. According to Newbery, government rationing of
sales at a fixed prices below the market price is effective at protecting consumers from
high price variability. The result is obtained on condition that the ration scheme is large
enough and its implementation cost is modest. The theory predicts that in absence of
comparative disadvantages with public storage, price stabilization programs that use
buffer stocks are cost effective.
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Russo et al. (2011) relaxes the perfect competition assumption. According to the
authors, the effects of traditional policies like price floors largely depend on the market
structure. In concentrated markets, removal of government interventions such as price
supports would result in considerable net welfare loss. In addition, the government’s cost
in implementing such programs where market power exists is very high. The outcome
would be different in a competitive market. Thus, various policy outcomes can be
observed under various market structures.
Price Stabilization Empirical studies
Price Floors and Ceilings
The oldest empirical study on price controls reviewed here in was conducted by
Kehoe and Serra-Puche (1986). In their study, the authors applied a Walarsian general
equilibrium analysis to examine the effect of price controls and subsidies on food in
Mexico. The study found that there was a strong relationship in both directions between
relative variations in prices and price controls. They concluded that responsiveness of
supply to prices determines the welfare impact of an agricultural price support program.
Kyei and Parton (1996) deviate from the approach taken by Kehoe and SerraPuche (1986) by utilizing a partial equilibrium modeling approach. Their study evaluates
a price control (floor and ceiling) policy for maize in Ghana. From an efficiency stand
point, they concluded that price controls reduce the market efficiency in that the
consumer surplus tends to be lower than producer surplus resulting in a reduction in
consumption of the commodity. In addition, the net social benefit of implementing such a
program is negative.
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Villoria et al. (2002) analyzed the effects of the Andean Price Band System
(APBS) on producer price variability and welfare in Columbia, Ecuador and Venezuela.
Their work extends the analysis of price controls discussed earlier by including the
producer price variability. The study focused on four commodities namely maize, rice,
sugar and milk. The authors found that the implementation of the APBS stabilized
domestic prices for the four commodities in Columbia and Ecuador but not in Venezuela.
This difference was assumed to be due to the instability in Venezuela’s exchange rate. In
general, the contribution of APBS to producer welfare was insignificant for some
products, and in others was significant but small. The result was presumably due to small
risk reduction benefits from reduced price variability and low income transfers.
Chavas and Kim (2004) analyzed the effect of the USA price floor policy in three
markets (cheese, butter and nonfat dry milk) using a dynamic multivariate tobit model.
The study introduces the aspect of cross price volatility in assessing the effect of price
floor policy but ignores the welfare distributional effects of a price floor policy. There
were four major findings of their study. The first is that the impact of a price floor on
cross price volatility is negligible when the price floor was lower than the market price.
Secondly, the binding price support program was more effective in reducing price
volatility than the non-binding price support program. Third, the impact of the price floor
policy varied across the commodities. Finally, price changes have a very small impact
under government control and contribute to a short-run price volatility reduction.
Chavas and Kim (2005) extend the work of Chavas and Kim (2004) by analyzing
the effects of a price floor on price dynamics. Their study specifically addresses the
effects of a price floor policy on price volatility and economic efficiency. The study uses
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a dynamic tobit model and focuses only on American cheese. The authors found that
lower support prices reduced taxpayers’ costs and aggregate welfare loss but did not
improve relative economic efficiency of transferring income from consumers to
producers. According to the study, a price support program reduces price volatility. The
price support program’s price volatility reduction was more pronounced in the short run
than in the long run. In addition, the long term price dynamics can be significantly
affected by government policy even under limited government intervention due to
cumulative effects of an increase in price support on expected market prices.
Feil et al. (2013) analyzed the effect of three policy options on economic
efficiency in a dynamic-stochastic modeling framework. Simulations demonstrated that
price floors enforced by government purchases of the surplus in the market yields lower
economic efficiency than either production ceilings or investment subsidies. The result
was due to erosion of consumer surplus when demand is high and a production ceiling is
implemented. Producers’ gains were almost zero in all the three policy scenarios.
Mariano and Giesecke (2014) analyzed the macroeconomic and food security
effects of the rice paddy price floor, the rice price ceiling, and the subsidy programs in
the Philippine’s rice market. Using a computable general equilibrium model, they found
that the gains from allocative efficiency without implementing these programs are small
and could be outweighed by indirect macroeconomic effects in the short to medium term.
Jonasson et al. (2014) modeled the welfare effects of agricultural policies in
developing countries, including Malawi. The simulation results revealed that floor prices
on food crops in developing countries have a negative effect on the targeted beneficiaries
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through raising the food prices. This is because some food crop producing households
buy the same food crops they sold later on.
Price controls have also been used in other sectors apart from agriculture to
influence market outcomes. Battacharya et al. (2004) analyzed the effect of price controls
in the secondary health insurance markets in eight states in the United States. They found
that the price controls negatively affect relatively poor consumers, with having weak
bequest motives and a high rate of time preference. This is mainly because the policy is
binding to relatively healthy HIV patients that would like to vitiate their health insurance
policy to meet other needs related to the management of the disease.
The common finding in the previous empirical studies is that price floors and
ceilings reduce economic efficiency. However allocative efficiency losses due to price
support programs could be outweighed by indirect gains realized from their
implementation. In regards to price volatility reduction, evidence from the empirical
literature suggests that price controls reduce price volatility.
Government storage programs and price volatility
Brennan (2003) analyzed the impact of public intervention in to the Bangladesh
rice market using a rational expectations dynamic programming model. The study
concluded that public storage programs have a high probability of reducing high food
prices compared to private storage. This is mainly because of the high costs associated
with storage.
As opposed to Brennan (2003), Chavas and Kim (2004) investigated the effect of
opening government stock on price volatility of three commodities (cheese, butter and
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nonfat dry milk) in USA. They found that government stocks reduce price volatility in all
the commodities.
Chavas and Kim (2005) shift the focus of analysis in Chavas and Kim (2004) on
the effect of government stock on price volatility to latent price volatility for American
cheese. They found that higher government stocks increase latent price volatility.
The literature reviewed on government storage suggests that government storage
programs reduce price volatility of commodities but does not reduce the latent volatility.
Empirical literature on private storage
Deaton and Laroque (1992) analyzed commodity prices in the framework of a
rational expectations competitive storage model. Their focus was on assessing the extent
to which the model explains behavior of prices for some commodities. They concluded
that the rational expectations competitive storage model can account for skewness, as
well as rare but violent explosions in prices in more normal times.
Chavas and Kim (2004) deviate from Deaton and Laroque (1992) approach of
testing the rational storage model. They analyze the effect of opening commercial stock
on price volatility of cheese, butter and nonfat dry milk in USA. The effect of private
stock on price volatility varied across commodities. Private stocks increased American
cheese price volatility and reduced price volatility for nonfat dry milk. There was no
significant effect of private stock on butter despite having a positive sign. The authors
concluded that their findings on the effect of private stock nonfat dry milk were
consistent with the competitive storage behavior while those for American cheese and
butter were not. They speculated that the inconsistency with the competitive storage was
driven by (i) the effects of the political economy of setting prices on price expectations
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influencing stockholding decisions, and (ii) strategic behavior of dominant firms in
imperfect markets.
Chavas and Kim (2005) change the focus of analysis in Chavas and Kim (2004) to
the effect of private stocks on latent price volatility for American cheese. The study
found that higher private stocks reduce the latent price volatility for American cheese.
Poulton et al. (2006) argue that there is need for a sound strategy to stabilize
prices. The major motivation behind this argument is that the extent to which private
sector storage and trade can stabilize prices in drought or glut years is limited. In
addition, the extent to which private storage would reduce intra-seasonal variations in
prices in the context of African countries is not known.
Myers (2013), using threshold auto-regression models, analyzed the effectiveness
of private trade and storage on maize price instability in Malawi. The study concentrated
on intra-seasonal private sector storage. The author found that there was a consistency
between competitive storage behavior and seasonal maize price patterns in private
markets. The findings imply that the private sector in Malawi is effective in smoothing
intra-seasonal price variations.
The reviewed literature analyzes effects of private storage on price volatility in
the framework of competitive storage behavior. In some cases the role of private storage
on price volatility was consistent with a competitive storage model in others it was not.
Divergent findings are thought to arise from, among others, firms’ strategic behavior in
imperfectly competitive markets.
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The classical storage model and its limitation
The classical storage model has been used in a number of studies (e.g. Deaton and
Laroque, 1992; Brennan, 2003; Chavas and Kim, 2004; Chavas and Kim, 2005; and
Myers, 2013) in understanding storage and commodity prices. In the model, price
fluctuations are as a result of exogenous and endogenous supply shocks (Williams, 1936;
Ezekiel, 1938; and Malan, 2013).
The basic assumption of the classical model is that firms engage in storage
seeking to maximize expected profits. As such storage firms use all available information
(i.e. yield and price distributions) to form rational expectations of prices. The decision to
store is made when expected future prices are greater than the current prices (Brennan,
1958; Muth, 1961; Wright and Williams, 1982; and Makki et al. 2001). The necessary
condition for storage requires the discounted expected future prices change equals the
marginal cost of storage (Brennan, 1958; and Wright and Williams, 1982).
All premises of the classical model are based on the assumptions that markets are
perfectly competitive and prices are exogenous to storage firms. Consequently, the
storage model is devoid of firms’ strategic behavior. However, agricultural markets
outside farming are rarely perfectly competitive (Russo et al., 2011). Therefore prices are
often likely to be affected by firms’ strategic behavior.
Furthermore, endogenous shocks in supply are said to come from producing
firms’ response to previously observed prices. No convincing explanation is provided on
the circular argument of the causes of output quantity changes which in turn lead to
changes in prices that leads producers to respond in output. This leaves a gap in
explaining how changes in price expectations that drive storage decisions under the
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competitive storage model come about. Hence strategic storage models may provide the
means in understanding how firms’ strategic storage behaviors affect price volatility and
their response in kind, as well as the final impact on market efficiency.
Strategic storage models
The earliest work reviewed in the thesis on strategic capacity was conducted by
Spulber (1981). He developed a dynamic sequential entry model for incumbent firms in a
market. The model envisages that an established firm will continue to produce constant
output, if and only if, the comparative capacity cost is greater than net discounted
marginal returns. The theory further establishes two conditions that must be satisfied for
an established firm to carry over excess output before its rival’s entry. According to
Spulber these conditions are: (i) the established firm’s Stackelberg equilibrium output
should be more than its monopoly output and (ii) short-run discounted marginal benefits
of monopoly output in the second period should be higher than the cost of capacity.
Arvan (1985) expands on the work by Spulber (1981) by assuming that Cournot
firms do not have a first mover advantage and shifting the focus from capacity to
inventory production. In this context, the author demonstrates that a symmetric Nash
equilibrium does not exist for a two period duopoly game with symmetric firms facing
time invariant costs and revenue. Inexistence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium arises
from firms’ failure to locally influence second period sales through inventory investment.
According to Arvan inventory commitment in the first period is equivalent to assuming
leadership in period two for joint inventory vectors. This results into non-concavity of the
Nash value function in inventory hence failure of standard methods to prove existence of
Nash equilibrium.
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Arvan (1985) further predicts that the sub-game perfect equilibrium outcomes
would be asymmetric irrespective of firms having symmetric revenue functions.
Existence of a sub-game perfect equilibrium for the game is however not guaranteed and
they might be multiple equilibria. It is not difficult to prove/show that in the two period
duopoly game a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists (Arvan, 1985).
Chavas (2008) estimates a conceptual T-period storage model that includes
various market structures including perfect, imperfect and incomplete Cournot
competition. A firm stores a commodity if its expected discounted marginal revenue is
equal to marginal storage cost. For market power exercising firms, marginal revenue has
a market power parameter. The author identifies size of the firm’s market share and inelasticity of demand as factors leading to exercising of market power. According to
Chavas, the exercise of market power encourages (discourages) stockholding when stock
increases (decreases) are expected in the next period. This results in variations in stock
thereby smoothing stock overtime. Based on this, the model predicts that market power
would result in increased price volatility through stock reduction. However, the author
does not solve for the strategic equilibrium citing the difficulties found in Arvan (1985)
among others.
Anton and Das Varma (2005) consider instead consumers storing at no cost. The
two period duopoly model assumes consumers are price takers with different valuations
of the good. The model also assumes producers are Cournot competitors. In this context,
the model predicts a limiting result in that equilibrium prices rise indefinitely. As such,
consumers act rationally to purchase in advance for future consumption.
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There are a number of limitations with the reviewed work on strategic storage.
First, in some market settings both consumers and producers do not have the storage
capacity, as such the role of storage is only performed by intermediaries. For example,
U.S. grain trading and storage companies such as Cargill and ADM are intermediaries.
Lastly, the reviewed work on strategic storage in one way or another assumes either a
producer or a consumer of a commodity has market power. The said limitations may
result in different market outcomes if these assumptions are relaxed (i.e. Cournot
intermediaries who simultaneously buy, sell and store goods).
Price Stabilization Laboratory Experiment Studies
Price Floors and Ceilings
Smith and Williams (1981) analyze the effect of nonbinding price controls in a
double auctioning setting using the experimental approach. They found that both price
ceilings and price floors do not act as price signals on which buyers and sellers can base
their contracts. In addition, the study failed to provide conclusive evidence that nonbinding price controls would bias prices either above or below the equilibrium price.
This is mainly because it was difficult to determine whether the approach of prices from
below or above the equilibrium price was due to price controls or bargaining
characteristics of market participants.
Isaac and Plott (1981) through an experimental approach assessed the effect of
price controls on bidding behavior in two-sided oral auction markets. The study mainly
focused on responses to modifications in the institution; market volume and price levels;
and efficiency. The study had three major findings (i) price controls set at competitive
prices result in divergence of prices from competitive equilibrium, (ii) inefficiencies
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resulting from binding price controls were larger than those predicted from a
conventional consumer surplus analysis, and (iii) removal of a binding price control
results into discontinuous adjustment of prices. Additionally, no evidence was found for
price controls serving as a reference for collusion. However, no plausible explanation was
provided why price levels changed when nonbinding price controls were removed
without a change in demand.
Dufwenberg et al. (2004) analyzed the impacts of costs to sellers from not
adhering to the market equilibrium. The authors employed a Luce error model relevant
for Bertrand game in the presence of a price floor to analyze experimental results. The
study found that an increase in price floor increases competition among sellers leading to
more competitive commodity pricing in a duopoly setting. The result was due to the
information that sellers were provided on prices chosen by their co-player after each
period during the game.
Gode and Sunder (2004) analyzed structural effects of non-binding price controls
on double auction dynamics using the zero information model to separate effects of
market rules on outcomes. The study found that a non-binding price ceiling has effects
on both buyers and sellers. In regards to buyers, a non-binding price ceiling promotes
participation of buyers that can buy outside the competitive price (extra-marginal buyers)
which in turn results in reduced market efficiency. On the other hand, efficiency is
significantly improved if sellers have costs exceeding the ceiling price and intra-marginal
buyers are prohibited from entry.
Engelmann and Muller (2011) analyzed the effect of price ceilings on collusion
by sellers using an experimental approach. Consistent with Isaac and Plott (1981), the
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study found that price ceilings do not result in higher levels of collusion. They attributed
this finding to failure of their design to allow sellers to communicate on collusion and
also act as a group instead of individuals.
Speculation, Intermediary and Price Stabilization
Miller et al. (1977) analyzed the effect of speculation on inter-temporal
competitive equilibrium using the double auction institution. Their experiment had two
treatments across two seasons (Blue and Yellow). In the first treatment, buyers only knew
the future value of the commodity in the second season at the time of purchase. In the
second treatment, only traders were allowed to speculate but had imperfect demand and
supply information in the two seasons. Hence, resale prices in period two remained
uncertain to traders. The study concluded that: (i) inter-temporal competitive models
work even in situations where there is imperfect demand and supply information and (ii)
the presence of speculators in markets with cyclical demands is not a sufficient condition
to cause instability.
Plott and Uhl (1981) analyzed the effect of middlemen on competitive
equilibrium in a double oral auction setting. In this setting, all offer and bid prices
remained active as opposed to where new ask or bid price replace older prices (bid or
ask). In addition, only middlemen had full information on buying and selling prices. The
study found that increasing the number of middlemen in speculative markets does not
lead to market instabilities due to increased competition. The study failed to establish that
the middlemen take advantage of primary producers by underpricing and consumers by
overpricing the commodity. This was attributed to the institutional arrangement in the
experiment.
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The price control experiment literature focuses on proving existence of the focal
point hypothesis in laboratory markets, structural effects of price controls and impacts of
decision errors in markets that have few sellers. Studies of price controls and collusion
have failed to prove the existence of the focal point hypothesis. In terms of structural
effects of price controls, experimental studies have demonstrated that if a price control
program is in place it would reduce or increase efficiency depending on whether it
promotes intra/extra marginal buyers or sellers. Finally, increasing the price floor
increases competition in duopoly markets in cases where the sellers have full information
on the prices chosen by rival sellers.
Research gap identified in the literature
No literature was found that assesses the implications of different government
market timing interventions (as in Malawi) on market stability and other market
outcomes. Secondly, classic storage models significantly diverge from a game theoretic
approach taken by Arvan (1985). The classic storage models explain the decision to store
as a function of current and expected prices. This is a simplification of an otherwise
complicated process where a firm has to determine exactly how much to store given that
the firm does not operate in isolation. As such strategic storage models like that of Arvan
(1985) would provide additional information on issues related to storage decisions.
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CHAPTER IV
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, a straightforward Cournot model of strategic behavior between
intermediary (maize) traders who make simultaneous decisions to buy, sell and store
goods across three intra-seasonal periods is developed. Next, the model is expanded to
include a fixed government intervention policy. Care is taken to include as many realistic
assumptions of Malawi’s maize market and government intervention policies as possible,
balanced against maintaining tractability of the game. The theory developed in this
chapter is then parameterized to develop testable hypotheses in laboratory experiments.
Acknowledgement is made that some assumptions are not entirely realistic.
Nevertheless, it will be demonstrated that useful insights are obtained from the modeling
framework regarding strategic interactions that impact intra-seasonal price volatility.
Theoretical predictions indicate that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria for
intermediary firms in the models, as was also the case in Arvan (1985) and Chavas
(2008) for a producer only model. However, mixed strategies necessarily exist. To gain
further insights via further simplification, it is assumed that firms are able to partially
coordinate their storage and sales. Under partial coordination, multiple pure strategy
Nash equilibria are found, including mixed strategies. Therefore, given the random
nature of choices in mixed strategy games, price volatility will naturally emerge
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independent of demand and supply shocks considered as a major source of price volatility
in past non-strategic literature.
General Market Setting and Model Assumptions
As discussed in Chapter II, there are four maize major marketing seasons in
Malawi. The first season comprises the highest volume of maize supplied by farmers
followed by a reduced supply in the second season. There is negligible maize supplied by
farmers in the third season and none in the fourth season (the lean season). Based on
major seasons of farm supply, the number of marketing seasons (periods) is reduced to
three. The first and second periods remain the same, but the third and fourth marketing
season are combined, identifying the lean season.
To begin, assumptions are made and are compared to the description of the
Malawi maize market in Chapter II. Realities that are ignored in the interest of
tractability are noted throughout.
i)

First, for simplicity it is assumed that the country is a closed economy;
hence there is no international trade.

ii)

The Malawian maize market has more than one competing intermediary
trader. Whether the traders compete in prices or quantities is
indeterminate. However, given that firms that store must first chose and
maintain capacity, it is assumed that the firms are Cournot competitors.

iii)

Though there are many heterogeneous intermediary traders in Malawi
(small to large), for simplicity it is assumed that there are only two
symmetric traders. This assumption is not as weak as it appears as there
are relatively few large traders that command a large share of the market.
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According to Mvula et al. (2003) the maize market is relatively
concentrated.
iv)

For simplicity it is assumed that the intermediary traders face downward
sloping long run linear inverse consumer demand and upward sloping long
run linear inverse farmer supply. These attributes of supply and demand
confer market power to the intermediary traders, without additional
assumptions of market power via a trading institution, such as auctions or
bargaining.

v)

In each of the three periods, demand remains constant. Figure 4.1 depicts
the relevant market supply and demand relationships. The last graph in
Figure 4.1 represents the aggregate (annual) market derived from
summing across each period’s supply and demand.
It is assumed that intermediary traders make simultaneous and
independent decisions on output and input quantities throughout the year.
These decisions directly influence period market prices. Note, there is no
restriction that the firms technically make their decisions at the same point
in time, only that the firms learn of the output choices by their rival at the
same time.
Figure 4.1 indicates the game between the intermediaries is sequential,
not simultaneous. For a simultaneous game, it must further be assumed
that firms are able to make binding commitments for future delivery early
‘enough’ in the year that the game is essentially simultaneous. The degree
of forward contracting in Malawi by intermediary traders is unknown.
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vi)

Most farmers in Malawi sell their maize immediately after harvesting as
discussed in Chapter II. This is due to cash needs and inadequate storage
technology. We therefore assume that farmers do not have storage
capacity, unlike Arvan (1985) and Chavas (2008). Additionally,
consumers are assumed to be unable to store maize for any considerable
length of time, unlike Anton and Das Varma (2005).

vii)

Though market supply and demand is expected to change across
production years, unlike classic storage models with stochastic process
(e.g. Feil et al., 2013 and Deaton and Laroque, 1992), it is assumed that
annual aggregate supply and demand is held constant across production
years. This assumption is made to facilitate the identification and control
of strategic impacts on price volatility.

viii)

Since the interest of this study is restricted to intra-seasonal price
volatility, it is assumed that intermediary traders have storage and can buy
and sell in every period, but not across production years. This assumption
facilitates the identification and control of intra-seasonal strategic
behavior, as well as a simplification for modeling and experimental
purposes.
This assumption does not result in significant deviations from real
strategic issues encountered by firms as the governments stabilization
program is implemented on an annual basis as discussed in Chapter II.

ix)

The government, when interacting in the market, takes on the role of an
intermediary buyer, but may or may not buy and sell in every period
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depending upon its policy. For instance, the government policy as
described in Chapter II clearly indicates that the Malawi government’s
policy to date is to purchase maize during the second period and strictly
sell when there is no production in the lean season to those who cannot
afford to purchase maize at the current market price.
x)

For simplicity, it is assumed that all intermediate traders, including the
government, experience no storage costs and no storage capacity
constraints.

xi)

As they are no storage costs for intermediate traders, it is further assumed
that the associated costs for later period sales are determined solely from
the price the intermediary firm (and potentially the government) paid for
the input in the associated period.

xii)

It is assumed that the sole objective of private intermediary traders is to
engage in intra-seasonal arbitrage to maximize expected profits.

xiii)

Though the objective of the Malawi government is to engage in intraseasonal arbitrage to reduce input/output price/quantity volatility, the
government is relegated as an exogenous pseudo player in the game.

xiv)

It is assumed that each intermediary trader has complete information.

xv)

Finally, it is assumed that no new intermediary traders can enter the
market and that the existing intermediary traders do not exit the market.

Having detailed the basic assumptions of the modeling framework, the three period
Cournot duopoly intermediary model is formalized in the first section. Next, because
there are few firms, a monopoly model is developed to benchmark potential collusive
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outcomes in the second section. Finally, following the existing Malawi policy discussed
in Chapter II, an algorithm closely aligned with the policy is implemented by the
government and its strategic impacts on the independent firm model are detailed in the
final section. Conclusions related to the theoretical predictions are then discussed.

Figure 4.1

Supply and Demand in Periods 1, 2 and 3 plus Aggregate Annual Supply
and Demand

Three period Cournot duopoly intermediary model and its predictions
Let inverse demand functions facing all intermediary firms in periods one, two
and three be defined as g  Qd 1  , g  Qd 2  and g  Qd 3  respectively. Also defining inverse
farmer supply function faced by all intermediary firms in periods one and two as f  Qs1 
and l  Qs 2  respectively. Lastly, let p i represent firm i ' s profit.
Based on the above definitions and model assumptions, intermediary firm i ' s
objective function can be mathematically expressed as:
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Max  i  qi11,qi12 ,qi13 ,qi 22 ,qi 23 ,qi11,qi12 ,qi13 ,qi 22 ,qi 23    g  Q  q   f  Q  q  
d1

qi11 , qi12 , qi13 , qi 22 , qi 23

i11

s1

i11

period one production profit
Period two production profit

 g  Q  q   f  Q  q    g  Q  q
d2

i12

s1

i12

d2

i 22

 l  Qs 2  qi 22    g  Qd 3  qi13   f  Qs1  qi13  

Profit frominventory carry over to period2from period1

(4.1)

Profit frominventory carry over to period 3 from period1

 g  Q  q  l  Q  q 
d3

i 23

s2

i 23

Profit frominventorycarryover to period 3 fromperiod 2

Where qi11 is firm i ' s period one purchases to be sold in period one, qi12 is firm i ' s
period one purchases to be sold in period two, qi13 is firm i ' s period one purchases to be
sold in period three, qi 22 is firm i ' s period two purchases to be sold in period two and
qi 23 is firm i ' s period two purchases to be sold in period three.

Further defining q- i11 as firm i ' s rivals’ period one purchases to be sold in
period one, q- i12 as firm i ' s rivals’ period one purchases to be sold in period two, q- i13
as firm i ' s rivals’ period one purchases to be sold in period three, q- i 22 as firm i ' s
rivals’ period two purchases to be sold in period two and q- i 23 as firm i ' s rivals’ period
two purchases to be sold in period three.
Taking first derivatives of intermediary firm i 's payoff function  i  with
respect to intermediary firm i  i  1, 2 per period sales results into the following first
order conditions

g  Qd 1 
f  Qs1 
f  Qs1 
f  Qs1 
 i
 g  Qd 1  
qi11  f  Qs1  
qi11 
qi12 
qi13  0 (4.2)
qi11
qi11
qi11
qi11
qi11
f  Qs1 
g  Qd 2 
f  Qs1 
f  Qs1 
 i

qi11  g  Qd 2  
qi12  f  Qs1  
qi12 
qi13  0 (4.3)
qi12
q1i 2
qi12
qi12
qi12
f  Qs1 
f  Qs1 
g  Qd 3 
f  Qs1 
 i

qi11 
qi12  g  Qd 3  
qi13  f  Qs1  
qi13  0 (4.4)
qi13
qi13
qi13
qi13
qi13
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g  Qd 2 
l  Qs 2 
l  Qs 2 
 i g  Qd 2 

qi12  g  Qd 2  
qi 22  l  Qs 2  
qi 22 
qi 23  0 (4.5)
qi 22
qi 22
qi 22
qi 22
qi 22
l  Qs 2 
g  Qd 3 
g  Qd 3 
l  Qs 2 
 i

qi 22 
qi13  g  Qd 3  
qi 23  l  Qs 2  
qi 23  0 (4.6)
qi 23
qi 23
qi 23
qi 23
qi 23
Solving the first order conditions (4.2) to (4.6)  i  1, 2 results into the following
Cournot reaction functions:

qi11  BRi  qi11  

qi12  BRi  qi12  

qi13  BRi  qi13  

qi 22

f  Qs1 
f  Qs1 
qi12 
qi13
qi11
qi11
f  Qs1  g  Qd 1 

qi11
qi11

g  Qd 1   f  Qs1  





f  Qs1 
f  Qs1 
qi11  g  Qd 2   f  Qs1  
qi13
qi12
qi12
f  Qs1  g  Qd 2 

qi12
qi12

(4.8)

f  Qs1 
f  Qs1 
qi11 
qi12  g  Qd 3   f  Qs1 
qi13
qi13
f  Qs1  g  Qd 3 

qi13
qi13

(4.9)

g  Qd 2 
l  Qs 2 
qi12  g  Qd 2   l  Qs 2  
qi 23
qi 22
qi 22
 BRi  qi 22  
l  Qs 2  g  Qd 2 

qi 22
qi 22

qi 23  BRi  qi 23  



(4.7)

l  Qs 2 
g  Qd 3 
qi 22 
qi13  g  Qd 3   l  Qs 2 
qi 23
qi 23
l  Qs 2  g  Qd 3 

qi 23
qi 23

(4.10)

(4.11)

Specifying linear inverse demand functions in periods one, two and three as

g  Qd1   a  Qd1 , g  Qd 2   a  Qd 2 and g  Qd 3   a  Qd 3 respectively. Where Qd 1 , Qd 2
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and Qd 3 are aggregate sales in periods one, two and three respectively by two
intermediary firms. The inverse farmer supply functions in periods one and two are
defined as f  Qs1   b  Qs1 and l  Qs 2   c  Qs 2 respectively. Qs1 , Qs 2 are aggregate
purchases by two intermediary firms in periods one and two respectively.
Under these specifications, simultaneously solving the Cournot reaction functions
(4.7) to (4.11), the following optimal solutions for the two intermediary firms are
obtained:

1
a b 2c
1
a b 2c

q
2
a
b
c
,
q
q
,
q
2
a
b
c
,
q











   q212 ,




111
113
112
211
213

15
15 5 15
15
15 5 15

a 2b c
2a b c
2a b c

(4.12)
q223     q212 , q222     q212 , q122     q112 and
15
15
5
15
15
15
15
15
15

a 2b c

q123  15  15  5  q112


The optimal solutions imply that an intermediary firm’s purchases for sale in
period one are independent of any other period purchases and sales. Subsequent per
period sales are dependent on inventory stored by the intermediary firms from one period
to another. However, unique inventory solutions for storage from period one for sale in
period two by intermediary firms were not obtained.
The insight drawn from the theoretical predictions is that there is no optimal
solution in pure strategies for intermediary firms to maximize annual payoffs (profits),
given the specifications of supply and demand. Thus the pure strategy Nash equilibrium
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for the game does not exist. According to Nicholson and Snyder (2011) this result
necessarily indicates that there is only a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Given the results, it is therefore clear that there are numerous feasible decisions
that intermediary firms can make in this game. To gain traction in the solution process
based on insights drawn from the model results in (4.12), there appear to exist extreme
decisions that may be made by the intermediary firms to simplify the game. These
decisions involve intermediary firms opting not to sell or purchase in some periods. This
would require some degree of coordination by the firms to simplify the game. Given the
decision difficulties related to mixed strategies, there exists a strong incentive for
coordination by the intermediary firms.
Partial Coordination
Given the previous structural results, two forms of partial coordination are
considered. The first coordinated decision considered is when both intermediary firms
unilaterally decide not to store inventory in period one to be subsequently sold in period
two of the game. As a result, the intermediary firm’s objective function reduces to:

Max  i  qi11,qi13 ,qi 22 ,qi 23 ,qi11,qi13 ,qi 22 ,qi 23    g  Q  q   f  Q  q  
d1

qi11 , qi13 , qi 22 , qi 23

i11

s1

i11

period one production profit

Period two production profit

 g  Q  q  l  Q  q    g  Q  q   f  Q  q    g  Q  q  l  Q  q 
d2

i 22

s2

i 22

d3

i13

s1

i13

Profit frominventory carry over to period 3 from period1

d3

i 23

s2

(4.13)

i 23

Profit frominventorycarryover to period 3 fromperiod 2

Where qi11 is firm i ' s period one purchases to be sold in period one, qi13 is firm

i ' s period one purchases to be sold in period three, qi 22 is firm i ' s period two
purchases to be sold in period two and qi 23 is firm i ' s period two purchases to be sold in
period three.
46

Additionally defining q- i11 as firm i ' s rivals’ period one purchases to be sold in
period one, q- i13 as firm i ' s rivals’ period one purchases to be sold in period three,
q- i 22 as firm i ' s rivals’ period two purchases to be sold in period two and q- i 23 as firm

i ' s rivals’ period two purchases to be sold in period three.
Taking first derivatives of intermediary firm i 's payoff function (4.13) with
respect to intermediary firm i  i  1, 2 per period sales yields the following first order
conditions.

g  Qd 1 
f  Qs1 
f  Qs1 
 i
 g  Qd 1  
qi11  f  Qs1  
qi11 
qi13  0
qi11
qi11
qi11
qi11

(4.14)

f  Qs1 
g  Qd 3 
f  Qs1 
 i

qi11  g  Qd 3  
qi13  f  Qs1  
qi13  0
qi13
qi13
qi13
qi13

(4.15)

g  Qd 2 
l  Qs 2 
l  Qs 2 
 i
qi 22  l  Qs 2  
qi 22 
qi 23  0
 g  Qd 2  
qi 22
qi 22
qi 22
qi 22

(4.16)

l  Qs 2 
g  Qd 3 
g  Qd 3 
l  Qs 2 
 i
qi 22 
qi13  g  Qd 3  
qi 23  l  Qs 2  
qi 23  0 (4.17)

qi 23
qi 23
qi 23
qi 23
qi 23
Solving the first order conditions (4.14) to (4.17) yields the following Cournot
reaction functions  i  1, 2.

qi11  BRi  qi11  

f  Qs1 
qi13
qi11
f  Qs1  g  Qd 1 

qi11
qi11

g  Qd 1   f  Qs1  
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(4.18)

qi13  BRi  qi13  



qi 22  BRi  qi 22  

qi 23  BRi  qi 23  



f  Qs1 
qi11  g  Qd 3   f  Qs1 
qi13
f  Qs1  g  Qd 3 

qi13
qi13
l  Qs 2 
qi 23
qi 22
l  Qs 2  g  Qd 2 

qi 22
qi 22

g  Qd 2   l  Qs 2  

l  Qs 2 
g  Qd 3 
qi 22 
qi13  g  Qd 3   l  Qs 2 
qi 23
qi 23
l  Qs 2  g  Qd 3 

qi 23
qi 23

(4.19)

(4.20)

(4.21)

Recall that linear inverse demand functions in periods one, two and three are
defined as g  Qd 1   a  Qd 1 , g  Qd 2   a  Qd 2 and g  Qd 3   a  Qd 3 respectively. Where
Qd 1 , Qd 2 and Qd 3 are aggregate sales in periods one, two and three respectively by two

intermediary firms. Inverse farmer supply functions in periods one and two are defined as

f  Qs1   b  Qs1 and l  Qs 2   c  Qs 2 respectively. Qs1 , Qs 2 are aggregate purchases by
intermediary firms in periods one and two respectively.
Under the above specifications, simultaneously solving reaction functions (4.18)
to (4.21) the two firms’ optimal choices are:
1
2a b c
a b 2c
a 2b c

q111  15  2a  b  c  , q122  15  15  15 , q113  15  5  15 , q123  15  15  5 ,
(4.22)

q  1  2a  b  c  , q  2a  b  c , q  a  b  2c , q  a  2b  c
222
213
223
 211 15
15 15 15
15 5 15
15 15 5

The optimal solutions above imply that in the event intermediary firms coordinate
by not carrying over inventory from period one to period two (thus setting q112 and
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q212  0 ), there exist a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for intermediary firms with

symmetric pay offs.
This next decision analyzed involves intermediary firms deciding not to store
inventory in period one for sale in period three. The implied intermediary firm’s objective
function can be presented as:

Max  i  qi11,qi12 ,qi 22 ,qi 23 ,qi11,qi12 ,qi 22 ,qi 23    g  Q  q   f  Q  q  
d1

qi11 , qi12 , qi 22 , qi 23

i11

s1

i11

period one production profit

(4.23)

Period two production profit

 g  Q  q   f  Q  q    g  Q  q  l  Q  q    g  Q  q  l  Q  q 
d2

i12

s1

i12

d2

i 22

s2

i 22

d3

i 23

s2

i 23

Profit frominventorycarryover to period 3 fromperiod 2

Profit frominventory carry over to period2from period1

Where qi11 is firm i ' s period one purchases to be sold in period one, qi12 is firm

i ' s period one purchases to be sold in period two, qi 22 is firm i ' s period two purchases
to be sold in period two and qi 23 is firm i ' s period two purchases to be sold in period
three.
Defining q- i11 as firm i ' s rivals’ period one purchases to be sold in period one,
q- i12 as firm i ' s rivals’ period one purchases to be sold in period two, q- i 22 as firm i ' s

rivals’ period two purchases to be sold in period two and q- i 23 as firm i ' s rivals’ period
two purchases to be sold in period three.
Taking first derivatives of the intermediary firm’s payoff function (4.23) with
respect to per period sales, we obtain the following first order conditions  i  1, 2 :

g  Qd 1 
f  Qs1 
f  Qs1 
 i
 g  Qd 1  
qi11  f  Qs1  
qi11 
qi12  0
qi11
qi11
qi11
qi11

(4.24)

g  Qd 2 
l  Qs 2 
 i g  Qd 2 

qi12  g  Qd 2  
qi 22  l  Qs 2  
qi 22  0
qi 22
qi 22
qi 22
qi 22

(4.25)
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f  Qs1 
g  Qd 2 
f  Qs1 
g  Qd 2 
 i

qi11  g  Qd 2  
qi12  f  Qs1  
qi12 
qi 22  0 (4.26)
qi12
qi12
qi12
qi12
qi12
l  Qs 2 
g  Qd 3 
l  Qs 2 
 i

qi 22  g  Qd 3  
qi 23  l  Qs 2  
qi 23  0
qi 23
qi 23
qi 23
qi 23

(4.27)

Solving the first order conditions (4.24) to (4.27) we obtain the following Cournot
reaction functions:

qi11  BRi  qi11  

qi12  BRi  qi12  

qi 22



f  Qs1 
qi12
qi11
f  Qs1  g  Qd 1 

qi11
qi11

g  Qd 1   f  Qs1  

f  Qs1 
g  Qd 2 
qi11  g  Qd 2   f  Qs1  
qi 22
qi12
qi12
f  Qs1  g  Qd 2 

qi12
qi12

(4.28)

(4.29)

g  Qd 2 
qi12  g  Qd 2   l  Qs 2 
qi 22
 BRi  qi 22  
l  Qs 2  g  Qd 2 

qi 22
qi 22

(4.30)

l  Qs 2 
qi 22  g  Qd 3   l  Qs 2 
qi 23
l  Qs 2  g  Qd 3 

qi 23
qi 23

(4.31)

qi 23  BRi  qi 23  



As per earlier definitions, linear inverse demand functions in periods one, two and
three are specified as g  Qd 1   a  Qd 1 , g  Qd 2   a  Qd 2 and g  Qd 3   a  Qd 3
respectively. Where Qd 1 , Qd 2 and Qd 3 are aggregate sales in periods one, two and three
respectively by two intermediary firms. Inverse farmer supply functions in periods one
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and two are defined as f  Qs1   b  Qs1 and l  Qs 2   c  Qs 2 respectively. Qs1 , Qs 2 are
aggregate purchases by two intermediary firms in periods one and two respectively.
Simultaneously solving the Cournot reaction functions (4.28) to (4.31) under the
above function specifications, the optimal solutions in (4.32) are obtained.

1
a 2b c
2a b c
a b 2c

q

2
a

b

c
,
q



,
q



,
q

  ,


111
122
123
112

15
15 15 5
15 15 15
15 5 15

(4.32)
q  1  2a  b  c  , q  a  2b  c , q  a  b  2c , q  2a  b  c
222
212
223
 211 15
15 15 5
15 5 15
15 15 15
The optimal solutions in (4.32) imply that in the event intermediary firms partially
coordinate by not storing inventory from period one to period three, there exist a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium for intermediary firms with symmetric pay offs.
Each decision considered above has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In this
setting, the game is presented from a perspective that intermediary firms partially
coordinate on which firm sells their purchases in a particular period. This is depicted in
Table 4.1. Where strategies A and B represent the first and second decisions considered
respectively.
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Table 4.1

Corner solutions for the three period partial coordination Cournot duopoly
game
Firm 2
A:Sell q212  0 & q213  0

A:Sell q112  0
&
q113  0
Firm 1

B:Sell q113  0
&
q112  0

B: Sell q213  0& q212  0

1 2 2
6a  5b  2bc  3c2  4a  2b  c  ,
45
1 2 2
6a  5b  2bc  3c2  4a  2b  c  

45

2 2 2
3a  2b  bc  2c2  3a b  c  ,
45
2 2 2
3a  2b  bc  2c 2  3a  b  c  

45

2 2 2
3a  2b  bc  2c 2  3a  b  c   ,

45
2 2 2
3a  2b  bc  2c 2  3a  b  c  

45

2 2
3a  2b2  bc  2c 2  3a  b  c   ,

45
2 2
3a  2b2  bc  2c 2  3a  b  c  

45

The firm’s task in the three period duopoly game is to choose between strategy A
and B by comparing the payoffs of the two strategies given the choice of the other firm.
Thus strategy A weakly dominates strategy B if
2
1
3a 2  2b2  bc  2c 2  3a  b  c     6a 2  5b 2  2bc  3c 2  4a  2b  c  

45
45

In this case, the game presented in Table 4.1 will have two pure strategy Nash Equilibria.
These are A,A and B,B .
Similarly, if
2
1
3a 2  2b2  bc  2c 2  3a  b  c     6a 2  5b 2  2bc  3c 2  4a  2b  c  

45
45

the game in Table 4.1 will have three pure strategy Nash equilibria. These are

A,B ,B,B and B,A . Relying on weak dominance to predict a focal point, then the
expected equilibrium when humans are involved is B,B .
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Based on the assumption that period one farmer supply is greater than period two
farmer supply made earlier on, thus b < c then
2
1
3a 2  2b2  bc  2c 2  3a  b  c     6a 2  5b 2  2bc  3c 2  4a  2b  c   holds.

45
45

This results in the game depicted in Table 4.1 having two pure strategy Nash Equilibria

A,A and B,B where B,B is the weakly dominant equilibrium, as well as a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium (playing strategy B with certainty for both players). Therefore,
a refinement of the equilibrium concept results in the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium

B,B likely constituting a focal point equilibrium.

These findings are in line with the

original model findings, when there was no partial coordination.
Arvan (1985) developed a two period sequential duopoly game, with two
symmetric firms. In the game by Arvan (1985) firms could decide to produce inventory
in the first period for sale in the second period. Both firms in Arvan (1985) experienced
inventory storage costs, time invariant revenues and costs. The game developed in this
chapter deviates from Arvan (1985) in a number of ways. First, it shifts storage capacity
from producers to intermediary firms. Secondly, it has three periods. Thus intermediary
firms can purchase a commodity in first period and decide to sell it in the first, second
and/or third periods. Similarly, intermediary firms can also purchase a commodity in the
second period for sale in the second and/or third periods. Lastly, the game developed in
this study is simultaneous and without storage costs.
Despite the differences, there exist similarities between the current study and that
of Arvan (1985). Both games analyze the problem of inventory storage from a
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perspective of two symmetric firms and both models have a mixed strategy solution when
solved for all periods in question in each model.
Mixed strategies in duopoly model and price volatility
In the event intermediary firms use a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, then
quantities supplied by intermediary firms in each period will be stochastic due to strategy
randomization by intermediary firms. This results in price volatility; hence supply shocks
are not a necessary and sufficient condition for price volatility in oligopolistic markets
modeled herein.
The insights drawn from the model predictions imply that there are two causes of
price volatility. These are strategic behavior between firms and supply shocks. The model
developed in this study concentrates solely on strategic behavior as a source of price
volatility. Supply shocks could be introduced in the model in future research. Given the
current results, the combination of the lack of a dominant strategy, heterogeneous
subjective probabilities and risk aversion would most likely result in higher price
volatility than can be explained by only one aspect of decision making that firms face in
reality. Since government policy impacts firms’ strategic behavior, changing policy and
its different levels of enforcement are other sources of market volatility to be considered.
Monopoly model for collusive benchmarking
In this section it is assumed that intermediary traders act as a cartel. The firms’
objective is to maximize the total industry profits. The other assumptions remain as
stipulated earlier on.
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Let P represent the joint intermediary traders’ profit in the industry. Since there
are two intermediary firms in the market, P = p1 + p 2 . Where p1 is intermediary trader
one’s profit and p 2 is intermediary trader two’s profit.
Each intermediary trader’s profit is specified as

(4.33)
and

(4.34)
In (33) and (34) inverse demand functions facing the cartel in periods one, two
and three are denoted as g  Qd 1  , g  Qd 2  and g  Qd 3  respectively. These inverse demand
functions are specified as g  Qd 1   a  Qd 1 , g  Qd 2   a  Qd 2 and g  Qd 3   a  Qd 3 for
periods one, two and three respectively. Where Qd 1 , Qd 2 and Qd 3 are the cartel’s
aggregate sales in periods one, two and three respectively.
In equations (33) and (34) f  Qs1  and l  Qs 2  are inverse farmer supply
functions faced by the cartel in periods one and two respectively. These are specified as

f  Qs1   b  Qs1 and l  Qs 2   c  Qs 2 . Where Qs1 , Qs 2 are total cartel purchases in
periods one and two respectively.
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Further defining qi11 as firm i ' s period one purchases to be sold in period one,
qi12 as firm i ' s period one purchases to be sold in period two, qi13 as firm i ' s period one

purchases to be sold in period three, qi 22 as firm i ' s period two purchases to be sold in
period two and qi 23 as firm i ' s period two purchases to be sold in period three. Since we
assumed there are only two intermediary firms in the market, i takes on the values of 1
and 2.
The cartels objective function can be written as:

Max P

q111 , q112 , q113 , q122 , q123 , q211 , q212 , q213 , q222 , q223

= p1 + p 2

(4.35)

Taking first order derivatives and simultaneously solving the resulting reaction
functions, the following results are obtained.

ìï
1
a 3b c
ïï q211 = (2a - b - c)- q111 , q213 = - + - q112 - q113 - q212 ,
10
10 10 5
ïí
ïï
a b c
a b 3c
ïï q222 = - - - q112 - q212 - q122 and q223 = + - + q112 + q212 - q123
5 10 10
10 5 10
ïî

(4.36)

Interestingly, these results indicate there is no unique solution to the fully
coordinated monopolistic game. Furthermore, more choice variables are left without a
solution as compared to the duopoly model in equation (4.1). Finding at least one unique
solution which maximizes joint profits would require simulation.
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Model for the government maize purchases and subsidized sales algorithm
For simplicity purposes, we assume the government only purchases maize from
farmers. In addition, we assume the government purchases are for sale to those
consumers that cannot afford to purchase maize from traders at the prevailing market
price.
To begin, let the government budget B j be set by an authority to purchase maize
in the open market. The government can purchase in either one or both production
periods j  1, 2 and store the purchases at no cost. The government sells all purchased
maize in lean period ( k  3 ) at a price below the market price in period 3.
The government purchases enough maize qgj in respective production period(s) to
satisfy B j given the respective period market input price psj   j  (Q fj  qgj ), j 1, 2 ,
where Q fj  ijk qijk , i 1, 2 , j 1, 2 , k 1, 2,3 and Qsj  Q fj  qgj . For example, if
the government purchases in period 2 then Q f 2   q122  q123  q222  q223  and
ps 2  c  ((q122  q123  q222  q223 )  qg 2 ) , whereas government purchases in period 1 then
Q f 1   q111  q112  q113  q211  q212  q213  and

ps1  b  ((q111  q112  q113  q211  q212  q213 )  qg1 ) .

The quantity purchased in the respective period satisfies the budget balance
equation B j  psj qgj  ( j  (Q fj  qgj ))qgj . Rearranging the budget balance equation in
regards to qgj results in the quadratic equation, qgj 2  ( j  Q fj )qgj  B j  0 . Solving for
the appropriate value of qgj results in the government’s ex ante reaction function in (4.37)
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2 
1
qgj    j  Q fj  4 B j   j  Q fj    0  B j  0 and Q fj   j
2


(4.37)

Note that when B j  0  qgj  0 as such the firms’ reaction functions are
qijk (qijk , qgj ; Ω)  Q fj , where Wis a vector of supply and demand parameters including

B . The properties of qgj are


 j  Q fj
1

 
 1  0  B j  0 and Q fj   j
Q fj 2  4 B    Q 2
 j fj  

qgj

qgj
B j



1
4 B   j  Q fj 

2

 0  Bj 

1
  j 2  2 jQ fj  Q2fj  , and
4



 j  Q fj
1

 
 1  0  B j  0 and Q fj   j .
2
 j 2  4 B    Q
 j fj  


qgj

As a result of the government’s purchasing program, the government non-strategically
competes with market intermediaries. Graphically, the impact of the government’s
purchasing program is

58

Figure 4.2

Impact of government’s purchasing program in the j th period

Next, the government sells all inventory during the lean period ( k  3 ), qgj  qgj 3 ,
at a price below that of the period’s market price pg 3  p f 3 , where p f 3  3  Q f 3 .
Therefore, the government serves those that the market does not. Graphically, the impact
of the government’s sales program on consumer welfare is the increase in the area under
the demand curve (in Figure 4.3) due to reduction in price from p f to pg as a result of
the government quantity ( q g ) sold to consumers.
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Figure 4.3

Impact of government’s subsidized sales on consumer welfare

A) Given the budgeted expenditures and full sales of inventory
B j  psj qgj  S j 3  pg 3qgj 3 , where pg 3  3  (Q f 3  qgj 3 )  p f 3 and Qd 3  Q f 3  qgj 3 .

Because the government does not compete with firms during the lean period, the
government’s sales could be S j 3  (3  (Q f 3  qgj 3 ))qgj 3 . In general, however,
B j  S j 3 because psj  pg 3 and the government could operate at a surplus/deficit

depending upon the output choices of the firms. Given B j  ( j  (Q fj  qgj ))qgj , a zero
balance budget at the end of the year occurs only when

(

3

 (Q f 3  qgj 3 ))qgj 3  ( j  (Q fj  qgj ))qgj   3  Q f 3   j  Q fj which in turn



Q  Qf 3

 3   j  Q fj  Q f 3   fj
 1 . Given qijk (qijk , qgj ; Ω)  Q fj , the government


 3   j

surplus results are highly dependent upon the reaction of the firms to the presence of the
government’s purchasing/sales algorithm.
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B) To insure a consumer surplus neutral (CSN) budget, the additional consumer
surplus created by the redistribution must equal the original budget, or
B j  CS j 3  1/ 2   3  pg 3  Q f 3  qgj 3   1/ 2   3  p f 3  Q f 3 . The CSN price in the

third period is thus, pg 3 

2 B   j qgj 3  p f 3Q f 3
qgj 3  Q f 3

. The problem for the government, and

the experimenter, is setting B j  CS j 3 . The government will have to work off an
expectations of the firm’s aggregate reactions Q f 2 and Q f 3 .

Intermediary traders’ problem when the government conducts open market purchases
Given government purchases in the market, the intermediary trader’s problem is
to maximize its profits subject to its rival’s purchases and sales, as well as the
government policy. To begin, a policy closely aligned with the current Malawi
government is considered. The policy simply stated is that the government purchases in
the second period for later out of market sales in the lean period. Without relaxing the
assumptions made earlier, the intermediary trader’s problem without partial coordination
can be presented as:





Max  i qi11,qi12 ,qi13 ,qi 22 ,qi 23 ,qi11,qi12 ,qi13 ,qi 22 ,qi 23 ,qg 2   p f 1q   ps1q  
qi11 , qi12 , qi13 , qi 22 , qi 23

i11

i11

period one production profit

Period two production profit

p

f 2 qi12

  ps1qi12 







 p f 2 qi 22   ps 2 qi 22  

f 3 qi 23

  ps 2 qi 23 

f 3 qi13

  ps1qi13 



Profit frominventorycarryover to period 3 from period1

Profit frominventorycarryover to period2from period1

p

p



Profit frominventorycarryover to period 3 fromperiod2
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(4.38)

, ps1  b  Q fj , ps 2  c  (Q fj  qg 2 ) ,

Where

c is period two supply intercept and Q fj  ijk qijk , i 1, 2 , j  1, 2 and k 1, 2,3.

Taking first order derivatives of (4.37) and simultaneously solving the resulting
reaction functions under the above specifications, the following solutions are obtained:

(4.39)
There is clear evidence from the optimal solutions that intermediary traders’ per
period sales and purchases depend on the government maize purchasing budget B. In
addition, again only the purchases made in period one to be sold in the same period are
independent from purchases and sales made in other periods. Again, there is no unique
optimal solution for inventory stored from period one for sale in period two by
intermediary firms. This implies that government’s open market purchases do not
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eliminate the mixed strategy problem in the three period duopoly model. As such
price/quantity volatility will still be observed even when the government is involved in
maize purchases.
Conclusions of theoretical predictions
There are no theoretical solutions for the developed three period Cournot duopoly
model both in the absence and presence of government purchases and subsidized sales.
Similarly, the monopoly solution for the model does not exist. As such with or without
the government’s subsidized sales program, prices and quantities will be volatile.
Rationale for laboratory experiments
All models developed above do not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This
implies there are no clear theoretical predictions on how intermediary would maximize
profits through temporal arbitraging. To better understand how firms would wrestle with
this difficulty, requires laboratory experiments. More specifically, the results will be used
to identify how “behaviorally” firms/subjects developed rules of thumb in tackling
strategic difficulties identified in the private firm only game and the game with
government intervention.
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CHAPTER V
METHODS AND DATA

Due to the lack of adequate data to estimate maize market demand and supply in
Malawi, as well as structurally identifying numerous possible Nash and mixed strategy
behavior, the testing of the theoretical predictions in regards to price/quantity volatile
were conducted in experimental laboratory markets. Market experiments were designed
following the parameterization of demand, supply and the government budget theory
developed in Chapter IV. Specifically, the experimental design allows for evaluating the
effects of government market interventions on price/quantity volatility. The predicted
implications of mixed strategic behavior on market outcomes are used to develop testable
hypotheses. In this chapter, the experimental design, procedures, treatments and testable
hypotheses are provided.
Experimental design
All experiments were conducted May, 2015 in Malawi at Kamuzu College of
Nursing, Lilongwe Campus computer laboratory. Experimental subjects were recruited
from Agricultural and Applied Economics students at Lilongwe University of Agriculture
and Natural Resources (LUANAR), Bunda Campus. Announcements for experimental
sessions were placed at noticeboards advised by the University’s officials. Interested
students voluntarily signed up for the experiments.
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The market setting follows directly from the basic assumptions of the theoretical
framework developed in Chapter IV. The experimental design is as follows. Three
treatments (sessions) were conducted and are detailed below. Each session began with
four (4) practice rounds and subject earnings were derived from twenty (20) subsequent
trading rounds. Each round was equivalent to a trading year. Each treatment had twelve
(12) subjects, and in total thirty six (36) subjects were recruited. Subjects were randomly
paired for each trading round. Within each trading round, there were three trading
periods (equivalent to seasons). Figure 5.1 indicates the market output demand and input
supply schedules per period within a trading round.

Figure 5.1

Per period consumer demand and input provider schedules in a trading
round

All subjects were provided the information in Figure 5.1 as supplementary
material (Figure B.1, Appendix B). Across each period of a trading round, subjects faced
a constant downward sloping consumer demand. Subjects faced upward sloping input
supply in the first and second periods only, and the third period represents the lean
period. Input supply was larger for the first period than the second period. Both input
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supply and output demand were held constant across trading rounds. This allowed for
identification of strategic volatility.
In each of the twenty (20) trading rounds, randomly paired subjects competed for
the sale of output to consumers. As intermediary traders, the subjects were asked to make
five (5) separate output quantity decisions per trading round. The first three (3) output
decisions were sales in all three periods from purchases in the first period and two (2)
more for sales in the second and third period from purchases in the second period. The
required input purchases to meet sales decisions were automatically calculated for each
subject. Output decisions were indicated by entering any integer between 0 and 100 in
each of the provided five decision boxes (Figure B.2, Appendix B). Markets cleared in
the last period of a trading round as in Muller (2006) to better identify period
interdependencies.
After each subject had completed making the five sales decisions, information
was provided to subjects on own and rival’s sales quantity decisions, total per period
market sales, and total per period purchases to satisfy the selling decisions (Figure B.3,
Appendix B ). Again, total per period output sales and corresponding output market
prices were also provided. Similarly total per period purchases and corresponding input
market prices.
Each period’s output and input market prices in the market outcomes information
were determined based on the following formulae:

Each Period ' s Output Market price = 100 - TotalUnits Sold

(5.40)

Period1 Input Market price = TotalUnits Sold

(5.41)
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Period 2 Input Market Price = 25 + TotalUnitsPurchased

(5.42)

It is important to note that setting the slope of both supply and demand equal to one
eliminates the requirement to analyze both price and quantity volatility as they are equal.
The last piece of information provided to subjects was own and competitor’s
earnings. Each period’s earnings for a subject in any trading round were calculated based
on the following formulae:
Period 1 Earnings = [Own Period 1 Sales ] * [Period 1Output Market Price –
Period 1Input Market Price]

Period 2 Earnings = [Own Period 2 Sales of Period 1 Purchases]
*[ Period 2Output Market Price – Period 1Input Market Price] +
[Own Period 2 Sales of Period 2 Purchases ]
*[ Period 2Output Market Price – Period 2 Input Market Price]
Period 3 Earnings = [Own Period 3 Sales of Period 1 Purchases]*
[ Period 3Output Market Price – Period 1Input Market Price]
+ [OwnPeriod 3 Sales of Period 2 Purchases ]*
[ Period 3Output Market Price – Period 2 Input Market Price]

An individual subject’s earnings in a trading round were calculated by summing
each period’s earnings. All payoff formulas were provided to subjects as supplementary
material (Figure B.4, Appendix B). Period payoffs were then aggregated within and
across the trading rounds to calculate the subject’s cumulative earnings in the twenty (20)
trading rounds. To avoid bankruptcies, each subject was provided an unknown
endowment of 1,000,000 tokens. The endowment was kept confidential from subjects to
avoid endowment effects (Hansen and Lott, 1991; Loureiro, Umberger and Hine 2003).
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Procedures
Before conducting the experiments, the Mississippi State University Institutional
Review Board approved the study (IRB # 15-137) on 3rd May, 2015, to use human subjects
(See Appendix C). The experiments were conducted in three separate sessions. For each

treatment there was one experimental session. A session lasted for approximately two
hours. Upon arrival in the computer lab, subjects were told to go through the consent
forms on their computer terminals. This was done in each session. After going through
the consent forms and agreeing with the contents there-in, students signed the consent
forms.
After signing the consent forms, instructions for each treatment were read aloud
to subjects. During this period subjects were also silently going through copies of their
instructions. Upon completing reading the instructions aloud, a three minute break was
taken. This was to enable resolution of subjects’ queries.
Then subjects went into four practice rounds of the market experiments. This was
done to make subjects familiarize themselves with the programs. During and after the
four practice rounds subjects were allowed to ask any questions they had related to the
programs. After the questions, subjects went into the actual twenty (20) trading rounds of
the experiment.
Upon completing the twenty (20) trading rounds each subject’s earnings in
Malawi Kwacha were determined. The undisclosed exchange rates for one experimental
token to a dollar were 0.00003, 0.000029 and 0.000027 for treatments one, two and three
respectively. The subjects’ earnings also included a transport refund of US$10 and a
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show up fee of US$5. Dollars were then converted to Kwachas at an exchange rate of
450.
All experiments were coded using the laboratory experiment language of z-Tree
(University of Zurich, 2014). This was done to make the process of conducting
experiments less tedious.
Treatments
Three treatments differentiated by the level and timing of government market
interventions were conducted.
Treatment 1(Privatization): No government market intervention
This treatment was designed to enable testing of the hypothesis that there is no
significant difference in price/quantity volatility with or without government intervention.
Hence it is the base treatment against which all other treatments are compared. The
treatment was also used for comparison of welfare gains/losses arising from changes in
the timing of government market interventions.
Treatment 2: Current Policy (government purchases maize in period 2 only for
subsidized sales in period 3)
Treatment 2 closely mimics the current Malawi government’s price stabilization
policy. As per Chapter II, due to delayed funding ADMARC begins purchasing maize in
the second period for subsidized sales to consumers in period three. This amount
incorporates the humanitarian maize that has been requested to be drawn down for
subsidized sales to consumers in ADMARC’s markets. Subsidized sales are facilitated
from out of market maize sales in period 3, the lean period. Hence, the government does
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not compete with firms and aids those who are unable to afford maize at the market price
during the lean period. The government is treated as an exogenous pseudo player with a
fixed strategy. From Chapter II, ADMARC sales constitute 20 percent of the market
share. As such, the budget is set to 1220 so that if firms partially coordinate by not
storing inventory from period one to period three will result in the government
purchasing 20% of the market.
This treatment allows for testing the hypothesis that there are no significant
differences in strategic price/quantity volatility between the current Malawi government’s
policy (discussed in Chapter II) and the complete privatization policy (depicted in
treatment 1).
Treatment 3: Proposed Policy (government purchases maize in period 1 only for
subsidized sales in period 3)
Treatment 3 was designed to assess the effects of the current state of the world
where ADMARC experiences delayed funding and thus cannot freely purchase maize at
any point during the harvest season. In addition, treatment 3 also explores the gains in
market surplus that would be realized by changing timing of government market
interventions in the presence of budget constraints. This treatment policy allows the
government to take advantage of the high supply and low prices in the market.
Again, the government program/policy is introduced in the market as an
exogenous pseudo player in period one. Assuming firms partially coordinate by not
storing inventory from period one to period three, the budget is set to 1053 tokens to
result in 20% government market share. Therefore, the government can maintain its
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current presence at a lower cost. Again, these units are then sold to consumers in period
3 (lean season) that could not afford to purchase from intermediary traders.
Hypotheses
From the three treatments discussed above, the following statistical hypotheses
were tested.
i) Introducing the two maize policies does not significantly impact strategic
volatility in prices and quantities.
ii) No significant differences are observed in intermediate traders’ market
power by introducing the two maize policies.
iii) There are no significant differences in the distribution of producers’,
intermediate traders’ and consumers’ surplus by introducing the two maize
policies.
iv) Changing the timing in implementation of the government’s policy does
not significantly impact aggregate welfare.
Theoretical Predictions of Market Outcomes
Market outcomes for autarky and oligopoly cases are predicted. Autarky refers to
a situation where there is no trade (import and export). In this paper autarky refers to a
condition where intermediary traders do not store inventory to other periods. All
theoretical predictions are based on per period demand and farmer supply intercepts. The
exact intercept values are as in equations 39 and 40. For aggregate autarky market
outcomes, demand and farmer supply intercepts are 100 and 0 respectively.
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Autarky Market Outcomes
This section provides predictions for autarky market outcomes. Autarky
outcomes are free of the mixed strategies and the refined focal point equilibrium
previously discussed. Because there is no storage in autarky or supply in period three,
autarky outcomes do not exist for this period. Aggregate outcomes are an informative
comparison to the current theory if firms ignore the dynamic strategic issues previously
discussed, but exclude how firms would distribute sales to period three. Therefore, the
predicted outcomes were based on three extremely myopic behavioral assumptions for
intermediary traders. These are monopolistic, oligopolistic and competitive. The
predicted outcomes are presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1

Predicted autarky market outcomes

Market Outcomes
Quantity (purchased &
sold)
Output Price
Input Price
Consumer Surplus
Producer Surplus
Traders Profits

Traders’ Behavior
Monopoly
Oligopoly
Competitive
Monopoly
Oligopoly
Competitive
Monopoly
Oligopoly
Competitive
Monopoly
Oligopoly
Competitive
Monopoly
Oligopoly
Competitive
Monopoly
Oligopoly
Competitive
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One
25
33.33
50
75
66.67
50
25
33.33
50
312.5
555.56
1250
312.5
138.89
625
1250
1111.11
0

Period
Two
18.75
25
37.5
81.25
75
62.5
43.75
50
62.5
175.78
312.5
703.13
175.78
312.5
703.13
703.13
625
0

Aggregate
45
60
105
85
80
65
47.5
55
65
337.5
600
1837.5
1625
1375
2912.5
1687.5
1500
0

From Table 5.1 market power is predicted to be increasing across the traders’
behavior from competitive to monopoly. This leads to reduction in the predicted
consumers’ and producers’ surplus across the three traders’ behaviors considered.
Market outcomes with intermediary traders arbitraging intra-seasonal markets
As demonstrated in Chapter IV, a dominant pure strategy Nash Equilibrium for
the three period duopoly game does not exist. This leads to difficulties in predicting
market outcomes, especially price/quantity volatility. Therefore, non-volatility predicted
market outcomes for all treatments are based on the focal point identified in the previous
theory section. As discussed, the focal point equilibrium is where neither intermediary
firm stores inventory in period one for sale in period two. Predicted period two and one
input prices include government purchases in treatments two and three respectively,
assuming firms utilize the focal point.
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Table 5.2

Market outcomes when period one purchases are not sold in period two
Period

Policy
Treatment
One
Two
Three
Aggregate
Privatization
23.34
23.34
23.34
70.02
Current
Quantity Sold
20.66
20.66
25.34
66.66
Proposed
20.66
20.66
20.66
61.98
Privatization
43.34
26.68
n/a
70.02
Quantity Purchased Current
46
39.56*
n/a
85.56*
Proposed
52.56*
29.32
n/a
81.88*
Privatization
77
77
77
Current
Output Price
80
80
75
Proposed
80
80
80
Privatization
43
51
n/a
Current
Input Price
46
64*
n/a
Proposed
52*
54
n/a
Privatization
268.41
268.41
268.41
805.23
Current
Consumer Surplus
206.6
206.6
316.75
1386.43**
Proposed
206.6
206.6
206.6
1226.34**
Privatization
931.81
346.84
n/a
1278.65
Current
Producer Surplus
1058
771.38
n/a
1829.38**
Proposed
1369.09 425.14
n/a
1794.23**
Privatization
793.56
606.84
766.84
2167.24
Current
Traders Profits
702.44
330.56
886.04
1767.86
Proposed
578.48
537.16
401.18
1676.8
Privatization
4251.12
Current
Total Welfare
5143.85**
Proposed
3917.59**
Note: * are input prices with government purchases, ** include government sales and
purchases
Market Outcomes
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Table 5.3

Theoretical predictions on government intervention market outcomes

Subsidized price
Consumer surplus gain
Quantity Purchased by
government

Current Policy
56
656.48
18.9

Proposed Policy
60
606.54
19.9

The producer surpluses in periods one and two for Current and Proposed policy
treatments are also calculated taking into consideration government interventions. From
theoretical predictions, Privatization Policy has the lowest output prices. Both the Current
and Proposed policies are predicted to have high output prices in the first and second
periods. However, the current policy is predicted to have lower output prices in the third
period compared to the other two. In terms of total welfare, the current policy is predicted
to have higher total welfare than the other two policy treatments.
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CHAPTER VI
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents and discusses findings on the impacts of government maize
market policies (Privatization Policy, Current Policy – period 2 purchases only, Proposed
Policy – period 1 purchases only) on market outcomes. The focus is on (i) strategic
price/quantity volatility, (ii) intermediary trader market power, (iii) distribution of market
surplus among consumers, producers and intermediates, and (iv) total welfare. The results
for each policy treatment associated with hypotheses (i) – (iv) are presented graphically
and treatment effects tested using simple means tests. Though the experimental design is
a series of one-shot games, subject learning regarding their own optimal strategy will
necessarily occur. Though the graphical results include discussions of the trend
(convergence) of the respective statistics due to subject learning, no statistical results are
provided. This type of analysis is left for future research. Therefore, in many cases the
reported mean differences will not adequately test the long run predictions made in the
theoretical section.
Hypothesis i) Government maize market policies and strategic volatility in prices
Output price volatility
Volatility in output prices is measured by the standard deviations of output prices.
Standard deviations are calculated across six pairs of randomly matched subjects for each
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period for each of the twenty trading rounds. The level of output price volatility in each
treatment is then presented graphically. As there are no theoretical predictions,
experimental results are only compared across policy treatments.
Figure 6.1 demonstrates that in all three policy treatments output prices are
volatile across the twenty trading rounds in period one, but only treatment 2 (Current
Policy) steadily decreases in magnitude across trading rounds. Price volatility is highest
in treatment one (Privatization Policy) and lowest in treatment three (Proposed Policy).
All the graphs (Figures 6.1 to 6.3) on output price volatility in the three periods have an
exponential trend. Period one output price volatility converged to 15, 10 and 4 tokens in
the Privatization, Current and Proposed policy treatments respectively. The next graph
(Figure 6.2) presents output price volatility in period two across the twenty trading
rounds. The graph (Figure 6.2) indicates that output prices in period two are volatile
across the twenty trading rounds, and the magnitude declines for all treatments. Price
volatility is highest in the Privatization Policy treatment and lowest in the Proposed
Policy treatment. Figure 6.3 demonstrates that prices are still volatile in period three
across the twenty trading rounds. High output price volatility is observed in Privatization
and Current policy treatments and is the lowest in the Proposed Policy treatment. Again,
the magnitude of volatility decreases across trading rounds. In both periods (two and
three), output price volatility converged to 30, 15 and 4 tokens for Privatization Policy,
Current Policy and Proposed Policy respectively. Generally, it appears that period three is
the most volatile in all policy treatments. This is because intermediary sales in period
three are a function of period one and two purchases which individually do not have a
unique solution. The Proposed Policy treatment appears to have the least price volatility
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and a slower convergence. This implies that the Proposed Policy treatment reduces price
volatility and mitigates the need for strategic learning.
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In aggregate, Figure 6.4 demonstrates that reduction in per period output price
volatility translates into reduction in intra-seasonal price volatility. The intra-seasonal
price volatility is measured by taking the variance in output prices across randomly
matched subjects in each trading round around each trading round’s mean output price.
As is the case in each period, Privatization Policy treatment has the highest level of intraseasonal (within year seasons) price volatility as compared to any other policy treatment.
The intra-seasonal price volatility in the Current Policy treatment converges at a steady
rate to the intra-seasonal price volatility of roughly 3 tokens. The Proposed Policy
treatment converges to almost the same volatility level though at a slow convergence rate.
The Privatization Policy converges to the intra-seasonal volatility of roughly 17 tokens.
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Existence of output price volatility in each treatment in all the three periods across
the twenty trading rounds supports theoretical predictions in Chapter IV. Based on
insights drawn from Chapter IV, the observed output price volatility in the three
treatments is due to strategic behavior between firms. The general decline in volatility in
all the four graphs is attributed to subjects learning.
Before conducting means tests, normality tests on standard deviations of output
prices for each treatment are conducted. This is done to determine the appropriate
statistical test to use. Different statistical tests make different distribution assumptions on
the data. For instance, t-test and F-test assume data is normally distributed. As such
conducting statistical tests without verifying validity of their distribution assumptions on
the data would lead into erroneous conclusions (Shapiro and Wilk (1965); Gujarati and
Porter (2009)). The results of the normality test of each treatment’s price volatility are
presented in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1

Normality tests on standard deviations of output prices

Tests
Shapiro-Wilk
Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Privatization Policy
(n=20)
0.974582
0.120758

Current Policy
(n=20)
0.962096
0.118488

Proposed Policy
(n=20)
0.90179**
0.172455

Note: ** p < 0.05
As can be seen, we fail to reject all treatment null hypotheses that output price
standard deviations are normally distributed at all conventional significance levels using
Kolmogorov –Smirnov test. However, we fail to reject all treatment null hypotheses that
output price standard deviations are normally distributed at 1 % significance level using
Shapiro-Wilk test. Even though the Proposed Policy treatment is weakly normal, means
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tests using a simple t-statistic are appropriate. The Folded F test is used to test if sample
variances are equal. If the variances between samples are equal, then pooled t-statistic is
reported otherwise the Cochran t-test is reported to take into account the inequality of
variances between samples being compared.
Given the price volatility measures are normally distributed, F-tests are conducted
to determine if the observed price volatility across treatments is statistically different.
Results in Table 6.2 demonstrate that the Proposed Policy treatment has the lowest level
of output price volatility than the Privatization and Current policy treatments at all
conventional significance levels. Comparing the Privatization to Current policy
treatment, there is a statistically significant difference in period two output price volatility
at 10% significance level. However, there are no significant differences between
Privatization and Current policy treatments in output price volatility in periods one and
three. The results are not consistent with where price volatility in each period across the
two policy treatments converged to. Again, statistical tests for intra-seasonal volatility
demonstrate that there are significant differences in intra-seasonal output prices volatility
at all conventional significance levels in all the three treatments. The Proposed Policy has
the lowest and Privatization Policy the highest.
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Table 6.2

Statistical results on testing equality of variances in treatments

T1

T2

T3

T1vs T2

T1vs T3

T2 vs T3

SD

SD

SD

F-value

F-value

F-value

Period 1 output price

20.01

17.23

5.12

1.35

15.25***

11.3***

Period 2 output price

40.45

33.85

8.69

1.43*

21.67***

15.18***

Period 3 output price

39.59

40.96

8.55

1.07

21.43***

22.93***

Intra-seasonal output
price

18.67

14.65

3.99

1.62***

21.89***

13.49***

Notes: ***p < 0.01, * p < 0.10, T1 = Privatization Policy 1, T2 = Current Policy, T3 =
Proposed Policy and SD = Standard Deviation
Hence the hypothesis that government market intervention does not significantly
impact price volatility is rejected. Additionally, a hypothesis that changing the timing in
implementation of the government’s policy does not significantly impact strategic
volatility is rejected. Therefore, a conclusion is made that government intervention
impacts price volatility, more so for the Proposed Policy treatment.
Hypothesis ii) Maize policies and intermediate traders market power
The indicator of changes to intermediate traders’ oligopoly/oligopsony market
power is the comparison of the level of output and input prices across each treatment.
This is measured and tested for each period across the twenty trading rounds to
demonstrate the overall results and the results from learning.
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Level of output prices
Results in Figure 6.5 show that the Proposed Policy treatment has higher period
one output prices than Privatization and Current Policy treatments across the twenty (20)
trading rounds. Period one output prices in Privatization and Current Policy treatments
are roughly the same across the twenty trading rounds. Interestingly, the Proposed Policy
treatment remained close to the theoretical prediction of 80 tokens. Both the
Privatization and Current Policy treatments increased, but do not appear to fully reach the
theoretical predictions of 77 and 80 respectively.
The results depicted in Figure 6.6 indicate major divergence in output prices
between Privatization Policy and Current Policy treatments beginning in the second
period across the twenty trading rounds. The Proposed Policy treatment still has highest
average output prices, but both the Proposed and Current Policy treatments appear to
converge to the predicted level of 80 tokens, but clearly more so for the Proposed Policy
treatment. The Privatization Policy, though increasing throughout the trading rounds, did
not seem to converge to the theoretical prediction of 77 tokens.
Average output prices in all policy treatments in the third period across the twenty
trading rounds increase even further compared (as shown in Figure 6.7) to other periods
discussed earlier. Prices in Current Policy and Proposed Policy treatments are
approaching the same level where as Privatization Policy treatment output prices are the
lowest.
In all, the Proposed and Current Policy treatments appeared to converge to
theoretical predictions in periods two and three, though subjects in the Current Policy
treatment initially began at a significant disadvantage. In no period did the Privatization
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treatment reach predicted levels, and in all but the first period remained well below those
of the government interventions.
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The graphical analysis indicates that there are differences in the level of per
period output prices in each treatment. Interestingly, all policy treatments seem to try to
converge to the theoretical predictions on output prices in Table 5.2. More so the
Proposed Policy appears to converge faster to predicted prices. To assess if the mean
differences are statistically significant, statistical tests are conducted and presented in
Table 6.3.
Table 6.3

Output price
in period 1
Output price
in period 2
Output price
in period 3

Results of the equality of means tests in period one, two and three
intermediate output prices in Privatization, Current and Proposed policy
treatments
T1
(n=120)
M
66.56
(20.01)

T2
(n=120)
M
68.09
(17.23)

T3
T1vs T2
(n=120)
M
t-value
82.11
-0.6
(5.12)

43.22
(40.45)

56.43
(33.85)

76.69
(8.69)

43.32
(39.59)

61.97
(40.96)

79.16
(8.55)

T1vs T3 T2vs T3
t-value

t-value

8.25***

-8.54***

2.74***

8.86***

-6.35***

3.59***

9.69***

-4.50***

Notes: *** p < 0.01, Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations, T1 = Privatization
Policy, T2 = Current Policy, T3 = Proposed Policy and M = mean

Results in Table 6.3 indicate that in the Proposed Policy treatment mean output
prices are the highest compared to Privatization Policy and Current Policy treatments.
These results are statistically significant at all conventional significance levels.
Comparing Privatization Policy to Current Policy, results show that mean output prices in
periods two and three are high in Current Policy at all conventional significance levels.
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The mean intermediate traders’ output prices are different from the theoretical
predicted output prices presented in Chapter IV. The difference arises because on
average the subjects’ strategic behavior was different from the strategic behavior
assumptions made in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. However, it appeared that in both government
intervention treatments, subjects were able to more easily learn trading behavior
indicative of the theoretical predictions.
Comparing government subsidized output prices in period three to period three
intermediary traders’ output prices in Privatization, Current and Proposed Policy
treatments
Figure 6.8 is a comparison of subsidized prices in Current Policy and Proposed
Policy to intermediary traders output prices in all the three policy treatments.
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From Figure 6.8 subsidized prices are lower than intermediate traders’ output
prices in Current Policy and Proposed Policy treatments. In Current Policy treatment
subsidized prices are lower than in the Proposed Policy treatment. On average subsidized
prices are slightly higher than intermediary period three prices in Privatization Policy.
Though both the government intervention treatments trended toward higher output prices,
the government’s subsidized prices in both treatments appear to converge to those
observed with Privatization (trend lines omitted to reduce clutter). Therefore, the policy
rule implemented in this study strongly offset the observed increase in market power in
the final period. Statistical tests are conducted to determine if the average prices
between the two government intervention subsidized prices and the Privatization policy
treatment prices are statistically significant.
Table 6.4

Output price
in period 3

Results of the equality of means tests in period three intermediate output
prices in Privatization Policy and period three subsidized prices in Current
and Proposed policy treatments
T1
(n=120)
M

T2
(n=120)
M

T3
T1vs T2
(n=120)
M
t-value

43.32
(39.59)

45.25+
(37.06)

53.25+
(51.86)

-0.39

T1vs T3 T2vs T3
t-value

t-value

-2.70***

-2.32**

Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations, T1 =
Privatization Policy, T2 = Current Policy, T3 = Proposed Policy, M = mean and + =
subsidized output price

Statistical results indicate that there were no statistically significant differences
between the mean subsidized price in Current Policy and the mean intermediary traders’
output prices in period three in Privatization Policy. However, there were statistically
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significant differences in mean Proposed Policy subsidized output prices in period three
and intermediary prices of period three in Privatization Policy at all conventional
significance levels. Similarly, there were statistically significant differences between
mean subsidized prices in Current Policy and Proposed Policy at 5% significance level.
Again, subsidized prices observed are different from the predicted due to
differences in assumptions on intermediate strategic behavior and the behavior of
subjects in the experiments.
Level of input prices
The results regarding producer output prices (intermediary input prices) are
discussed. It is important to note that all input prices are inclusive of the respective
government intervention treatments. The graphical results for period one are depicted in
Figure 6.9. The results indicate that input prices are generally higher for the Privatization
treatment than the government intervention treatments. Additionally, all treatments
depict higher average prices than those predicted (43, 46, and 52, respectively). Proposed
Policy has the lowest input prices, though the Current Policy treatment appeared to be
converging to a lower level as was predicted by theory. Current Policy and Proposed
Policy input prices appear to decrease at a greater rate than Privatization Policy.
The graphical results for period two are provided in Figure 6.10. The results
indicate that average prices were generally higher in Privatization and Current Policy
treatments than predicted (51, and 64 tokens respectively). Privatization and Current
policy treatments have almost the same level of average input prices across the twenty
trading rounds and appear to converge to similar levels. However, the lowest average
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prices were observed for the Proposed Policy (appear converging to below 54 tokens),
and both government intervention policies appeared to be converging to those predicted.
The results of both period input prices suggests that introduction of government
intervention contributed to weaker input market power in the short run, but quickly

Average Input Prices (in tokens)

converge to higher market power in the longer run.
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The graphical analyses demonstrate that there are differences in the level of input
prices observed across three policy treatments. To validate the observed mean
differences in treatments, statistical tests provided in Table 6.5.
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Table 6.5

Results of means equality tests on period one and two input prices in
Privatization, Current and Proposed policy treatments

T1
(n=120)
M
Input price in
90.78
period 1
(51.47)

T2
(n=120)
M
73.53
(47.03)

81.13
(37.92)

81.70
(35.06)

Input price
in period 2

T3
T1vs T2
(n=120)
M
t-value
67.08
2.71***
(9.45)
45.87
(8.98)

-0.1

T1vs T3 T2vs T3
t-value

t-value

4.96***

1.47

9.91***

10.84***

Notes: *** p < 0.01, Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations, T1 = Privatization
Policy, T2 = Current Policy, T3 = Proposed Policy and M = mean

The results indicate that there are significant differences in mean period one input
prices between Privatization Policy and Current Policy at all conventional significance
levels. This implies that period one input prices in Privatization Policy are higher than in
Current Policy. There are significant differences in input prices for both periods between
Privatization Policy and Proposed Policy. The differences are significant at all
conventional significance levels. This implies that Proposed Policy has lower average
input prices in both periods than Privatization Policy. Again, the mean period two input
prices in Current Policy and Proposed Policy are significantly different at all
conventional significance levels. These results demonstrate that Proposed Policy has the
lowest mean input prices in period two than Current Policy.
Given the findings on output and input prices, the hypothesis that no significant
differences in traders’ market power exist by introducing the subsidized maize policies is
rejected. A conclusion is made that government subsidized maize policies may impact
market power in lieu of privatization. Generally, it was found that both the Current and
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Proposed Policies resulted in increased market power, more so for the Proposed Policy.
This result was predicted, though there may have been different strategic behaviors
adopted by the subjects.
Hypothesis iii) Maize policies and market surplus distribution
The analysis of the impacts of government policies on distribution of producers’,
intermediate traders’ and consumers’ aggregate surpluses is now addressed. In general
the results follow logically from the period analysis results of the previous market power
analysis, for the exception that in period three where the government provides output at a
subsidized price.
The graphical results for aggregate consumer surplus for those consumers who are
willing and able to purchase from the intermediaries are provided in Figure 6.11. The
results indicate that on average total consumer surplus is highest in Privatization Policy
and lowest in Proposed Policy, with the Current Policy treatment converging to those
observed for the Proposed Policy. These results diverge from theoretical predictions
where the Privatization Policy has the lowest consumer surplus of 805.23 tokens and the
Current Policy has the highest consumer surplus of 1386.43 tokens. The observed
difference in consumer surplus is largely due to higher output prices in the government
intervention treatments, more so for the Proposed Policy. Additionally, none of the
policy treatments seemed to converge to the respective predicted consumer surpluses.
The seemingly convergence values for the Proposed (607.67) and Current (1186.42) are
below the predicted. The apparent convergence value for the Privatization policy
(4565.5) is higher than the predicted values.
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The results of the average total producers’ surplus are provided in Figure 6.12.
The results indicate that producer surplus is the highest in Privatization Policy, lowest in
Proposed Policy, with the Current Policy treatment converging to that observed for the
Proposed Policy. These differences are due to lower average input prices realized in
Proposed Policy and lower prices for the Current Policy. This is contrary to theory which
predicts the Privatization Policy to have the lowest (1278.65 tokens) and the Current
Policy to have the highest (1829.38 tokens). Again, total producers’ surplus in the
Current and Privatization policies converged to values above those predicted by theory
except in the Proposed Policy treatment where convergence was towards a lower value.
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The results in Figure 6.13 demonstrate that intermediate traders’ profits were
highest in Proposed Policy and lowest in Privatization Policy. The only positive average
earnings observed were for the Proposed Policy. In all the policy treatments traders’
profits increased as trading rounds progressed. This again is attributed to subjects
learning. Though output and input prices for the government intervention treatments
generally converged to those predicted by theory, intermediary earnings were vastly
lower than that predicted. This result demonstrates that small differences in output and
input pricing from those predicted have a multiplicative effect on realized earnings.
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Even though it appeared that trader market power increases from the Current
Policy to the Proposed Policy, trader profitability was in the long run sustainable in only
the Proposed Policy Treatment, but slowly improved with the Current Policy. These
results indicate that government intervention reduces the strategic coordination issues
faced by firms, most likely due to reducing the size of the market the firms are able to
impact.
All presented graphs show that there are differences in market surplus distribution
among producers, consumers and traders. To assess if there are significant differences in
effects of the three policy treatments on market surplus distributions, statistical tests are
conducted. The treatment means difference statistical tests are reported in Table 6.6.
97

The results indicate that significant differences exists in consumer, producer and
intermediate surpluses between Privatization and Proposed policy treatments at all
conventional significance levels. Similarly, statistical significant differences in consumer,
producer and intermediate surplus exist between Current and Proposed policy treatments.
In all the cases discussed, Proposed Policy treatment had the highest intermediate surplus,
lowest consumers’ and producers’ surpluses.
Table 6.6

Results of comparing means on consumer, producer and traders surplus in
Privatization, Current and Proposed policy treatments
T1
(n=120)
M
5564.70
(6338.00)

T2
(n=120)
M
3728.60
(6462.80)

T3
T1vs T2
(n=120)
M
t-value
735.60
2.22**
(524.70)

T1vsT3

T2 vs T3

t-value
t-value
Total
8.32***
5.06***
consumer
surplus
Total
7721.80
5615.20
1690.00
1.86*
7.64***
4.81***
producer
(8609.20) (8897.90)
(827.90)
surplus
Intermediate -13285.50 -8478.50
831.30
-1.6
6.90***
-4.35***
profits
(22384.90) (23399.30) (1166.40)
Notes: *** p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05, p <0.10, M= mean , T1 = Privatization Policy , T2 =
Current Policy , T3 =Proposed Policy and Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations

No statistically significant differences exist in intermediate profits between
Privatization Policy and Current Policy treatments. Based on the statistical results, the
hypothesis that no significant differences exist in the distribution of producers’,
intermediates’ and consumers’ surpluses by introducing the two maize policies is
rejected.
Likewise the hypothesis that changing the timing of government intervention does
not significantly impact surplus distribution is rejected.
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Hypothesis iv) Government market interventions and total welfare
Though welfare distribution may be an important policy issue, the important
economic issue is the impacts of government intervention on total welfare. For Current
Policy and Proposed Policy treatments the total welfare also includes the realized
producer and consumer surpluses due to government market intervention.
Figure 6.16 show that total welfare is highest in Proposed Policy treatment and
lowest in Privatization Policy. Total welfare in Current Policy is slightly higher than total
welfare in Privatization Policy, but appears to be converging to that of the Proposed
Policy. As trading rounds progressed total welfare in Privatization and Current Policy
treatments increased.
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To determine if there are statistical differences in the observed total welfare in
Figure 6.16, statistical tests are done. Results in Table 6.7 show that Proposed Policy had
high total welfare than Privatization and Current Policy treatments. The differences in the
mean total welfare between Privatization Policy and Proposed Policy treatments were
statistically significant at all conventional significance levels. Similarly, the differences in
mean total welfare between Current and Proposed policy treatments were significant at
all conventional significance levels.
Table 6.7

Results of comparing mean total welfare in Privatization, Current and
Proposed policy treatments

T1
T2
T3
T1vs T2 T1vsT3
T2 vs T3
(n=120)
(n=120)
(n=120)
M
M
M
t-value
t-value
t-value
Total Welfare
1.02
1491.5
4125.5
-1.46
-5.88 *** -3.54 ***
(7659.9)
(8123.2)
(524.4)
Notes: *** p < 0.01, M= mean, Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations, T1 =
Privatization Policy, T2 = Current Policy and T3 =Proposed Policy

The mean welfare in each policy treatment significantly deviates from those
predicted by theory. According to theory, the predicted welfare for the Privatization,
Current and Proposed policy treatments are 4251.12, 5143.85 and 3917.59 respectively.
However, results show that the Proposed Policy treatment has the highest welfare
compared to any other policy. The Current Policy treatment is second. Deviations from
theoretical predictions are an indication that strategic issues faced by the firms result in a
compounding problem when analyzed at the most aggregate level. The results imply that
policies that reduce strategic price volatility result into increased total welfare in the
market.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, STUDY LIMITATIONS AND
FURTHER MODIFICATIONS

The study analyzes effects of current and two proposed Malawi government
market interventions on strategic price volatility among the existing intermediary traders
of maize. Three forms of government market interventions are analyzed within the game
theoretic framework, a proposed privatization policy, the current constraint of purchasing
maize during short supply, and a proposed relaxation of the current constraint to allow
the government to purchase during periods of large supply. The focus is on strategic
interactions and responses of private intermediaries to these potential and existing states
of the world.
Given that there are no strategic intermediary storage theories that directly
address the situation in Malawi, a simple and similar three period Cournot duopoly
storage model is developed to identify intra-seasonal price variation assuming no
carryover stocks. The model predicts that due to inexistence of a pure strategy Nash
equilibria in the game, volatile prices would arise from firms engaging in mixed
strategies. The modeling framework explicitly controls for exogenous shocks in demand
and supply, and hence reveals strategic volatility not identified and/or addressed in
previous literature. Therefore, empirical analyses of naturally occurring aggregate data
may inadvertently capture the compounded impacts of strategic volatility and exogenous
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shocks to demand and supply. To identify strategy from shocks is a tall order for the
typical aggregated and sometimes sampled data series collected by public entities and
analyzed in past literature. As such, a controlled laboratory experiment is conducted to
alleviate the problems of identification.
Within the controlled laboratory framework, a set of identified theories are tested
in regards to the impacts of privatization and changes in the timing of current government
intervention. The results identify that there are differences between theoretical
predictions and those observed on prices; quantities sold and purchased; and are much
larger at the aggregated level of surplus distributions and total welfare. The major source
of deviation is the strategic difficulty of the game for boundedly rational experimental
subjects. As shown in the theory section, the game does not have a set of unique Nash
equilibria across the three periods analyzed. In such type of a game, there are numerous
strategies (or rules of thumb) that could be adopted, including the complicated mixed
strategies. The theoretical predictions provided on prices, quantities, surplus distributions
and total welfare are based on one of many possible and would require at least some
partial coordination among the firms. As such, it was not surprising to find that subjects
in the experiment may have adopted a different strategy from the one identified.
However, output and input prices appeared to converge toward those predicted due to
learning in the repeated game setting of the experiment. This is an interesting result
given the subjects were randomly matched throughout the experiment and thus could not
learn via signaling.
Interestingly however, the smaller relative magnitude differences in predicted and
observed input and output prices resulted in tremendously different welfare distribution
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and total welfare. For instance, output and input prices tended to converge to those
predicted, but the small deviations resulted in vastly different total welfare impacts. The
most import difference is that the more budget efficient proposed policy was predicted to
be the least socially efficient outcome, but was instead found to be the most efficient
outcome in the experiment.
Despite differences in predicted and observed outcomes, the theoretical prediction
of the existence of mixed strategies resulting in price volatility was clearly observed.
This finding extends the current knowledge provided by classical storage models on
sources of price volatility. Classical storage models identify exogenous and endogenous
shocks in supply/demand as the only sources of variations in prices. Based on the
findings in this thesis, demand and supply shocks are not the only sources of volatile
prices. The strategic difficulties of intermediary traders combined with supply and
demand shocks would result in a compounding of price volatility. In addition, the
findings provide an explanation as to the sources of changes in prices that producers
respond to under the endogenous supply shocks theory.
In related studies (Arvan (1985) and Chavas (2008)), strategic difficulties are
identified as a challenge to firms engaged in storage of commodities. Their results are
similar to the findings in this paper in that strategic difficulties make it difficult for firms
to make adequate profits (as is demonstrated by the low level of profits realized by
intermediaries). Given this difficulty, firms may turn to illegal forms of market power for
survival, an oft assumed market failure in developing economies.
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Policy Implications
In the presence of strategic storage, the results indicate that strategic use of
government stock could reduce price volatility. The extent of strategic price volatility
reduction differs depending on the level and timing of the government’s interventions in
the market. From the two intervention policies analyzed, the proposed more cost effective
government market intervention would effectively reduce strategic price volatility if
purchases are conducted during periods of large supply. This would also reduce the tax
burden that such programs would have on tax payers.
However, it was identified that there may be a tradeoff between reducing price
volatility and market power. The reduction in strategic output price volatility due to
government intervention resulted in higher output and lower input prices, hence
squeezing both consumer and producer surpluses. Interestingly, intermediate traders
benefited from either government policy, aimed at reducing volatility. Intermediary
market surplus is generally improved and is greater/less than that of
consumers/producers. Hence, the government purchasing policies also tended to help
more producers than consumers. In terms of total welfare in the market, the policies that
reduced strategic volatility also result in higher total welfare than privatization of the
market. This result is largely due to a fixed government intervention rule and the
reduction of the available stocks the firms will compete.
Among the three policies, the Proposed Policy is recommended because it results
into high total welfare than the other two policies. Also the Proposed Policy addresses the
market surplus distribution issue in that all participants have positive surpluses.
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Study limitations and further research
Most of the analysis in the study relies on simple graphics and the comparison of
overall treatment means using the simple t-tests. Given that in a number of circumstances
the strategic behavior of subjects was dynamic, simple means are not a good
approximation of identifying longer run results. As such there is a need for future
research to improve the approximation of long run treatment effects on the asymptotic
convergence of firm behavior and related market outcomes (Nagler et al. 2013).
Additionally, the analysis in the study does not clearly identify the exact strategic
behavior that subjects adopted in the game. As such there is still more need to identify
mixed strategies or rules of thumb that subjects may have adopted contend with the
strategic difficulties of mixed strategies.
One of the government’s objectives of introducing a price stabilization program
might be to reduce producer return and consumer surplus risk. This implies that the
government’s welfare function would put more weight on minimizing producer return
and consumer surplus risk. As such a penalty function that penalizes high levels of
producer return and consumer surplus risk could be added to enhance the welfare analysis
that has been used in this study to identify which policy mitigates surplus risks to
consumers and producers.
The study was restricted to twenty trading rounds. Given the diversity in behavior
and the complexity of the game itself, the results obtained in this research might be less
reflective of the identified long run theory. Hence, the identifying long run strategic
behavior and market outcomes maybe improved by increasing the number of trading
rounds.
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There is also need to solve for the partial coordination game for both government
policy treatments in future research just like it was done for the privatization case.
In the analysis, it is assumed that there are no costs associated with storage.
However, in the reality there are always costs that are associated with storage. As such in
future research costs to storage should be considered. Inclusion of storage costs might
change the outcomes of the game in that high storage costs would reduce incentive to
store period one purchases to be sold in period three. This would likely shift the second
period purchases as well.
Finally, there is need to relax two assumptions so that the common policy
question on the tradeoff between efficiency and equity is analyzed. As pointed out in the
theory development, transactions in Malawi are negotiated as such there is need to relax
the assumption that both producers and consumers cannot negotiate for the prices.
Additionally, the assumption is made that intermediary firms are symmetric. Assuming
asymmetry in intermediate traders would almost assuredly lead to different outcomes and
policy recommendations.
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INSTRUCTIONS USED IN EXPERIMENTS
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**Instructions for Market Experiment (Treatment 1)**
Thank You All For Coming!
We truly appreciate your time and effort today.
At this time, please turn off your cell phones or set to vibrate if you are expecting an
extremely important call or text message. Thank you.
A) Your Role as an Experimental Subject and Earnings
•

You will be a market participant who buys and sells a fictitious good in a
series of trading rounds.

•

Your total earnings for the experiment today will equal the sum of your
trading round earnings.

•

Your earnings are recorded as tokens.

•

At the end of the experiment today, your token earnings are exchanged for
Malawi Kwachas at an undisclosed exchange rate.

B) Market Description
(Please refer to Figure 1 of the attachments: Market Output Demand and
Input Provider Market Schedules Per Period for a Single Trading Round)
•

You will keep this attachment for your reference throughout the
experiment today.

•

Notice that each trading round consists of three separate trading periods
(1, 2 and 3).

•

You can think of a trading round as a year and the periods as seasons.

•

In each trading period you will face a schedule of output market prices and
quantities that consumers are willing and able to purchase. This is
referred to as Market Output Demand Schedule and is represented by the
Black downward sloping lines.
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•

NOTE: The Market Output Demand Schedule is the same for each
period.

•

You will face a schedule of input market prices and quantities that
suppliers are willing and able to sell. This is referred to as Market Input
Supply Schedule and is represented by the Red upward sloping lines.
•

NOTE: The Market Input Supply Schedule is largest for Period 1,
smaller for Period 2, and does not exist for Period 3.

C) Market Environment and Trading Rules
•

You will be competing against a rival competitor for the sale of output
units to consumers that must be purchased from input suppliers.

•

You will be randomly matched with a new competitor for each trading
round.

•

You will compete in 20 trading rounds today.
(Please refer to Figure 2 of the attachments: Quantity Sales Decision
Screen)

•

You will keep this attachment for your reference throughout the
experiment today. As you can see, you will make 5 separate sales quantity
decisions as to the number of units you are willing to sell to consumers.
You will enter your decisions in the purple boxes. Quantities must be
integer values (e.g. 0, 1, 2,…,100).

•

Each sales quantity decision is in reference to the period you purchase the
goods and the period(s) you decide to sell the goods.
o Therefore, you are allowed to carry units you purchase in one
period over to be sold in a subsequent period(s).
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o NOTE: You and your competitor are the only potential sellers in
period 3 as the input suppliers do not produce in this period.
(Noted in Figure 1 of the attachments)
•

To sell in period 3, you and/or your competitor must carry forward
purchases from either Periods 1, 2, or both.

Example
•

Looking at the top three sales quantity decisions, you may decide
to sell A units in Period 1, B units in Period 2 and C units in Period
3 from your purchases in Period 1. By doing so requires that you
purchase [A + B + C] units in Period 1.

•

Looking at the bottom two sales quantity decisions, you may
decide to sell D units in Period 2, and E units in Period 3 from your
purchases in Period 2. By doing so requires that you purchase [D
+ E] units in Period 2.

•

Note: The required input purchases to meet your sales obligations
per period can be automatically calculated for you when you click
on the grey Calculate Sum Button.

•

You will have 1 minute to make your sales quantity decisions.

•

After you and your competitor have both made your respective output
decisions and both clicked on the red OK button located at the bottom
right of your screen, you both will observe the Market Summary Screen
for the trading round.

D) Trading Outcomes – Sales and Purchases
(Please refer to Figure 3 of the attachments: Market Summary Screen)
•

You will keep this attachment for your reference throughout the
experiment today.
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•

At the top of the screen denoted as SALES, you will observe your and
your competitor’s 5 sales quantity decisions.

•

At the bottom of each of your 5 sales quantity decisions you will observe
your and your competitor’s total per period sales.

•

To the right you will observe the total required per period purchases that
you and your competitor will have made to satisfy your sales quantity
decisions.

E) Trading Outcomes – Market Outcomes - Quantities and Prices
•

In the middle of the screen denoted as MARKET OUTCOMES, you will
observe the Total Units Sold, as well as the corresponding Output Market
Price for each period.

•

Corresponding to the Total Units Sold is the Total Units Purchased, as well
as the corresponding Input Market Price for each period.

•

NOTE: The Output and Input Market Prices are derived from the
respective Period Output Demand and Input Supply Schedules provided to
you in Figure 1 of attachments.

•

•

Each Period’s Output Market Price = 100 – Total Units Sold.

•

Period 1 Input Market Price = Total Units Purchased.

•

Period 2 Input Market Price = 25 + Total Units Purchased.

Therefore, Output and Input Market Prices are determined based on
how much you and your competitor sell/purchase in each period.
Graphical Example – Period 1 – Figure 1
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•

Assume you and your competitor together purchased 60 total units
in period 1. This would result in a Period 1 Input Market Price of
60 tokens = 60 units.

•

Assume you and your competitor together sold 30 of these units in
Period 1 and carry over 30 total units for sale in later periods. This
would result in a Period 1 Output Market Price of 70 tokens =
100 - 30 units.
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Graphical Example – Period 2 – Figure 1
•

Assume you and your competitor together purchased 50 total units
in period 2. This would result in a Period 2 Input Market Price of
75 tokens = 25 + 50 units.

•

Assume you and your competitor together sold a total of 30 units;
10 units of the Period 1’s purchases and 20 units of Period 2’s
purchases. This would result in a Period 2 Output Market Price
of 70 tokens = 100 - 30 units.
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Graphical Example – Period 3 – Figure 1
•

In all a total of 25 + 25 = 50 units will be carried forward and sold
in Period 3 resulting in an Output Market Price of 50 tokens =
100 - 50 units.

•

This leaves 50 – 20 = 30 units of Period 2’s purchases to be sold in
Period 3 with an original Input Market Price of 75 tokens.

•

This leaves 60 – 40 = 20 units of Period 1’s purchases to be sold in
Period 3 with an original Input Market Price of 60 tokens.
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F) Trading Outcomes – Earnings
•

At the bottom of the screen denoted as EARNINGS, you will observe
your and your competitor’s per period and total earnings.

•

As you are trading for multiple rounds, your running balance is provided
for you.
(Please refer to the last page of the attachments: Payoff Formulas)

•

You will keep this attachment for your reference throughout the
experiment today.

•

You and your competitor’s per period earnings for each round of trading
are calculated by the formulas provided in the attachment.

G) Trading Outcomes – Earnings – Mathematical Representation
•

Your earnings are determined based on how much you and your
competitor sell/purchase in each period.

•

Assume each competitor chose the following outputs following the
previous graphical Market Outcome example.
•

Period 1 Earnings = [15] *[70 – 60] = 150 tokens

•

Period 2 Earnings = [5] *[70 – 60] + [10] *[70 – 75] = 0 tokens

•

Period 3 Earnings= [10]*[50 – 60] + [15] *[50 – 75] = - 475
tokens

•

Total Round Earnings = 150 +0 – 475 = - 325 tokens

•

Trading Outcomes

(Please refer to figure 3 of the attachments: Market Summary Screen)
•

You will have 2 minutes to review the Market Summary Screen.
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•

After you and your competitor have both reviewed the SALES,
MARKET OUTCOMES and EARNINGS and have both clicked on the
red OK button located at the bottom right, you will observe the Sales
Decision Screen for the next round of trading.
(Please refer to figure 2 of the attachments: Quantity Sales Decision
Screen)

H) Summary: Market Relationships
•

In short the important price and quantity relationships to keep in mind are
as follows.
i. The more you sell, the more you must purchase.
ii. The more you and your competitor purchase, the higher the Market
Input Price.
iii. The more you and your competitor sell, the lower the Market
Output Price.
iv. The higher the Market Input Price in relation to a lower Market
Output Price, the lower the Earnings.
v. Again, Output and Input Market Prices are determined based on
how much you and your competitor sell/purchase in each period.

Any Questions?
•

Before we begin, let’s practice for 4 market rounds.

•

Please do not talk to other subjects during the experiment.

•

Please do not attempt to look at another subject’s screen.
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NOTE: The practice rounds will not affect your earnings for the
experiment today.
•

I will now start the experiment please click on the green z-leaf
Icon.

•

You should see before you the Sales Decision Screen as in figure 2
of the attachments.

•

Please make your per period output choices and click the grey
calculate button to view the quantities you would purchase in
each period to satisfy your output choices.

•

Click on the red OK button located at the bottom right of your
screen when you are satisfied with your output choices.

•

You should now see before you the Market Summary Screen as
in figure 3 of the attachments.

•

Please observe your and your randomly matched competitor’s
Sales decisions and review the resulting Market Outcomes and
Earnings.
•

Again, Figure 1 represents the market supply and demand
relationships in the experiment today.

•

After reviewing, please click on the red OK button located at the
bottom right of your screen to move to the next round.

•

Continue playing until all practice rounds are completed.
Any Questions?

•

Remember:
o The more you sell, the more you must purchase.
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o The more you and your competitor purchase, the higher the
Market Input Price.
o The more you and your competitor sell, the lower the
Market Output Price.
o The higher the Market Input Price in relation to a lower
Market Output Price, the lower the Earnings.
o Again, Output and Input Market Prices are determined
based on how much you and your competitor
sell/purchase in each period.
o Period 1 Earnings are related to sales of units purchased in
period1
o Period 2 Earnings are related to a summation of the sales of
units carried forward from period 1 and the sales of units
purchased in period 2
o Period 3 Earnings are related to a summation of the sales of
units carried forward from periods 1 and 2.
•

Please do not talk to other subjects during the experiment.

•

Please do not attempt to look at another subject’s screen.

•

Please understand there are no wrong or right decisions, only those
that you believe are in your best interest.
Let’s Begin!



Start the relevant Treatment Program



Follow previous steps of starting the experiment

**Instructions for Market Experiment (Treatment 2)**
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Market instructions for treatment 2
Thank You All For Coming!
We truly appreciate your time and effort today.
At this time, please turn off your cell phones or set to vibrate if you are expecting an
extremely important call or text message. Thank you.
A) Your Role as an Experimental Subject and Earnings
•

You will be a market participant who buys and sells a fictitious good in a
series of trading rounds.

•

Your total earnings for the experiment today will equal the sum of your
trading round earnings.

•

Your earnings are recorded as tokens.

•

At the end of the experiment today, your token earnings are exchanged for
Malawi Kwachas at an undisclosed exchange rate.

B) Market Description
(Please refer to Figure 1 of the attachments: Market Output Demand and
Input Provider Market Schedules Per Period for a Single Trading Round)
•

You will keep this attachment for your reference throughout the
experiment today.

•

Notice that each trading round consists of three separate trading periods
(1, 2 and 3).

•

You can think of a trading round as a year and the periods as seasons.

•

In each trading period you will face a schedule of output market prices and
quantities that consumers are willing and able to purchase. This is
referred to as Market Output Demand Schedule and is represented by the
Black downward sloping lines.
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•

NOTE: The Market Output Demand Schedule is the same for each
period.

•

You will face a schedule of input market prices and quantities that
suppliers are willing and able to sell. This is referred to as Market Input
Supply Schedule and is represented by the Red upward sloping lines.
•

NOTE: The Market Input Supply Schedule is largest for Period 1,
smaller for Period 2, and does not exist for Period 3.

C) Market Environment and Trading Rules
•

You will be competing against a single competitor for the sale of output
units to consumers that must be purchased from input suppliers.

•

You will be randomly matched with a new competitor for each trading
round.

•

You will compete in 20 trading rounds today.
(Please refer to Figure 2 of the attachments: Quantity Sales Decision
Screen)

•

You will keep this attachment for your reference throughout the
experiment today. As you can see, you will make 5 separate sales quantity
decisions as to the number of units you are willing to sell to consumers.
You will enter your decisions in the purple boxes. Quantities must be
integer values (e.g. 0, 1, 2,…,100).

•

Each sales quantity decision is in reference to the period you purchase the
goods and the period(s) you decide to sell the goods.
o Therefore, you are allowed to carry units you purchase in one
period over to be sold in a subsequent period(s).
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o NOTE: You and your rival competitor are the only potential sellers
in period 3 as the input suppliers do not produce in this period.
(Noted in Figure 1 of the attachments)
o Also NOTE: There is an independent entity which is not a subject
in the experiment but a computer procedure mandated to purchase
a fixed budgeted token equivalent amount from input suppliers in
period 2 only for sales to consumers that cannot afford to purchase
from the two traders, in period 3.
•

To sell in period 3, you and/or your competitor must carry forward
purchases from either Periods 1, 2, or both.

Example
o Looking at the top three sales quantity decisions, you may decide
to sell A units in Period 1, B units in Period 2 and C units in Period
3 from your purchases in Period 1. By doing so requires that you
purchase [A + B + C] units in Period 1.
o Looking at the bottom two sales quantity decisions, you may
decide to sell D units in Period 2, and E units in Period 3 from your
purchases in Period 2. By doing so requires that you purchase [D
+ E] units in Period 2.
o Note: The required input purchases to meet your sales obligations
per period can be automatically calculated for you when you click
on the grey Calculate Sum Button.
•

You will have 1 minute to make your sales quantity decisions.

•

After you and your other competitor have both made your respective
output decisions and both clicked on the red OK button located at the
bottom right of your screen, you both will observe the Market Summary
Screen for the trading round.
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D) Trading Outcomes – Sales and Purchases
(Please refer to Figure 3 of the attachments: Market Summary Screen)
•

You will keep this attachment for your reference throughout the
experiment today.

•

At the top of the screen denoted as SALES, you will observe your and
your competitor’s 5 sales quantity decisions.

•

At the bottom of each of the sales quantity decisions you will observe your
and your competitors’ total per period sales.

•

To the right you will observe the total required per period purchases that
you, your competitor, and the independent entity will have made to satisfy
all your sales quantity decisions.

E) Trading Outcomes – Market Outcomes - Quantities and Prices
•

In the middle of the screen denoted as MARKET OUTCOMES, you will
observe the Total Units Sold, as well as the corresponding Output Market
Price for each period.

•

Corresponding to the Total Units Sold is the Total Units Purchased, as well
as the corresponding Input Market Price for each period.

•

NOTE: Total units purchased in period 2 include the purchases of the
independent entity.
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•

Also NOTE: The Output and Input Market Prices are derived from the
respective Period Output Demand and Input Supply Schedules provided to
you in figure 1.

•

•

Each Period’s Output Market Price = 100 – Total Units Sold.

•

Period 1 Input Market Price = Total Units Purchased.

•

Period 2 Input Market Price = 25 + Total Units Purchased.

Therefore, i) Input Market Prices are determined based on how much
you, your competitor and independent entity purchase in each period, ii)
Output Market Prices are determined based on how much you and your
competitor sell in each period.

•

REMEMBER: The independent entity does not sell in competition with
you and your competitor in period 3.
Graphical Example – Period 1 – Figure 1
•

Assume you and your competitor together purchased 60 total units
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in period 1. This would result in a Period 1 Input Market Price of
60 tokens = 60 units.
•

Assume you and your competitor together sold 30 of these units in
Period 1 and carry over 30 total units for sale in later periods. This
would result in a Period 1 Output Market Price of 70 tokens =
100 - 30 units.

Graphical Example – Period 2 – Figure 1
•

Assume you and your competitor together purchased 50 total units
in period 2.

•

Government Algorithm: 1220 tokens = the increase Q multiplied
by the increase in P.

•

This result in an additional 14 units purchased by the independent
entity for sale to consumers that cannot afford to purchase the
output from two traders in period 3.

•

This would result in a Period 2 Input Market Price of 89 tokens
= 25 + 50 + 14 units.

•

Assume you and your competitor together sold a total of 30 units;
10 units of the Period 1’s purchases and 20 units of Period 2’s
purchases. This would result in a Period 2 Output Market Price
of 70 tokens = 100 - 30 units.
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NOTE: In the graph above, if the competitors total input choice in period two results in
an intital (in absence of the independent entity) input market price (dotted blue lines),
then the independent entity chooses the quantity that exhausts its 1220 token budget.
This results in period two total input purchases and final (with the presence of the
independent entity) market price represented by the black dotted lines.

NOTE: However, as displayed in the figure below if the competitors total input choice
were smaller than in the previous example, then the independent entity will be able to
purchase more inputs given its 1220 token budget. This is because the intial (in absence
of the independent entity) input market price would be smaller than in the previous
example.
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Graphical Example – Period 3 – Figure 1
•

In all a total of 25 + 25 = 50 units will be carried forward and sold
in Period 3 resulting in an Output Market Price of 50 = 100 - 50
units.

•

This leaves 50 – 20 = 30 units of Period 2’s purchases to be sold in
Period 3 with an original Input Market Price of 89, due to the
purchases of the independent entity.

•

This leaves 60 – 40 = 20 units of Period 1’s purchases to be sold in
Period 3 with an original Input Market Price of 60.
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F) Trading Outcomes – Earnings
•

At the bottom of the screen denoted as EARNINGS, you will observe
your and your competitor’s per period and also your total earnings.

•

As you are trading for multiple rounds, your running balance is provided
for you.
(Please refer to the last page of the attachments: Payoff Formulas)

•

You will keep this attachment for your reference throughout the
experiment today.

•

You and your competitor’s per period earnings for each round of trading
are calculated by the formulas provided in the attachment.

I) Trading Outcomes – Earnings – Mathematical Representation
•

Your earnings are determined based on how much you, your competitor,
and the independent entity purchase in each period and how much you
and your competitor sell in each period.
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•

Assume each of the two competitors chose the following outputs
following the previous graphical Market Outcome example.
•

Period 1 Earnings = [15] *[70 – 60] = 150 tokens

•

Period 2 Earnings = [5] *[70 – 60] + [10] *[70 – 89] = -140
tokens

•

Period 3 Earnings= [10]*[50 – 60] + [15] *[50 – 89] = - 685
tokens

•
•

Total Round Earnings = 150 -140 – 685 = - 675 tokens

Trading Outcomes
(Please refer to figure 3 of the attachments: Market Summary Screen)

•

You will have 2 minutes to review the Market Summary Screen.

•

After you and your competitor have both reviewed the SALES,
MARKET OUTCOMES and EARNINGS and have both clicked on the
red OK button located at the bottom right, you will observe the Sales
Decision Screen for the next round of trading.
(Please refer to figure 2 of the attachments: Quantity Sales Decision
Screen)

J) Summary: Market Relationships
•

In short the important price and quantity relationships to keep in mind are
as follows.

•

In short the important price and quantity relationships in any given period
to keep in mind are as follows.
i. The more you sell, the more you must purchase.
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ii. The more you, your competitor and the independent entity
purchase, the higher the Market Input Price.
iii. The less you and your competitor purchase, the more the
independent entity purchases.
iv. The more you and your competitor sell, the lower the Market
Output Price.
v. The higher the Market Input Price in relation to a lower Market
Output Price, the lower the Earnings for both competitors.
vi. Again, Output and Input Market Prices, as well as Earnings are
determined based on how much you, your competitor, and the
independent entity purchase in each period and how much you
and your competitor sell in each period.

Any Questions?
•

Before we begin, let’s practice for 4 market rounds.

•

Please do not talk to other subjects during the experiment.

•

Please do not attempt to look at another subject’s screen.
NOTE: The practice rounds will not affect your earnings for the
experiment today.

•

I will now start the experiment please click on the green z-leaf
Icon.

•

You should see before you the Sales Decision Screen as in figure 2
of the attachments.

•

Please make your per period output choices and click the grey
calculate button to view the quantities you would purchase in
each period to satisfy your output choices.
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•

Click on the red OK button located at the bottom right of your
screen when you are satisfied with your output choices.

•

You should now see before you the Market Summary Screen as
in figure 3 of the attachments.

•

Please observe your and your randomly matched competitor’s
Sales decisions and review the resulting Market Outcomes and
Earnings.
•

Again, Figure 1 represents the market supply and demand
relationships in the experiment today.

•

After reviewing, please click on the red OK button located at the
bottom right of your screen to move to the next round.

•

Continue playing until all practice rounds are completed.

•

Remember:

Any Questions?

o The more you sell, the more you must purchase.
o The more you, your competitor and the independent entity
purchase, the higher the Market Input Price.
o The less you and your competitor purchase, the more the
independent entity purchases.
o The more you and your competitor sell, the lower the
Market Output Price.
o The higher the Market Input Price in relation to a lower
Market Output Price, the lower the Earnings for both
competitors.
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o Again, Output and Input Market Prices, as well as
Earnings are determined based on how much you, your
competitor, and the independent entity purchase in each
period and how much you and your competitor sell in
each period.
o Period 1 Earnings are related to sales of units purchased in
period1
o Period 2 Earnings are related to a summation of the sales of
units carried forward from period 1 and the sales of units
purchased in period 2
o Period 3 Earnings are related to a summation of the sales of
units carried forward from periods 1 and 2.
•

Please do not talk to other subjects during the experiment.

•

Please do not attempt to look at another subject’s screen.

•

Please understand there are no wrong or right decisions, only those
that you believe are in your best interest.
Let’s Begin!



Start the relevant Treatment Program



Follow previous steps of starting the experiment

**Instructions for Market Experiment (Treatment 3)**
Market instructions for treatment 3
Thank You All For Coming!
We truly appreciate your time and effort today.
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At this time, please turn off your cell phones or set to vibrate if you are expecting an
extremely important call or text message. Thank you.
B) Your Role as an Experimental Subject and Earnings
•

You will be a market participant who buys and sells a fictitious good in a
series of trading rounds.

•

Your total earnings for the experiment today will equal the sum of your
trading round earnings.

•

Your earnings are recorded as tokens.

•

At the end of the experiment today, your token earnings are exchanged for
Malawi Kwachas at an undisclosed exchange rate.

G) Market Description
(Please refer to Figure 1 of the attachments: Market Output Demand and
Input Provider Market Schedules Per Period for a Single Trading Round)
•

You will keep this attachment for your reference throughout the
experiment today.

•

Notice that each trading round consists of three separate trading periods
(1, 2 and 3).

•

You can think of a trading round as a year and the periods as seasons.

•

In each trading period you will face a schedule of output market prices and
quantities that consumers are willing and able to purchase. This is
referred to as Market Output Demand Schedule and is represented by the
Black downward sloping lines.
•

NOTE: The Market Output Demand Schedule is the same for each
period.
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•

You will face a schedule of input market prices and quantities that
suppliers are willing and able to sell. This is referred to as Market Input
Supply Schedule and is represented by the Red upward sloping lines.
•

NOTE: The Market Input Supply Schedule is largest for Period 1,
smaller for Period 2, and does not exist for Period 3.

H) Market Environment and Trading Rules
•

You will be competing against a single competitor for the sale of output
units to consumers that must be purchased from input suppliers.

•

You will be randomly matched with a new competitor for each trading
round.

•

You will compete in 20 trading rounds today.
(Please refer to Figure 2 of the attachments: Quantity Sales Decision
Screen)

•

You will keep this attachment for your reference throughout the
experiment today. As you can see, you will make 5 separate sales quantity
decisions as to the number of units you are willing to sell to consumers.
You will enter your decisions in the purple boxes. Quantities must be
integer values (e.g. 0, 1, 2,…,100).

•

Each sales quantity decision is in reference to the period you purchase the
goods and the period(s) you decide to sell the goods.
o Therefore, you are allowed to carry units you purchase in one
period over to be sold in a subsequent period(s).
o NOTE: You and your rival competitor are the only potential sellers
in period 3 as the input suppliers do not produce in this period.
(Noted in Figure 1 of the attachments)
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o Also NOTE: There is an independent entity which is not a subject
in the experiment but a computer procedure mandated to purchase
a fixed budgeted token equivalent amount from input suppliers in
period 1 only for sales to consumers that cannot afford to purchase
from the two traders, in period 3.
•

To sell in period 3, you and/or your competitor must carry forward
purchases from either Periods 1, 2, or both.

Example
o Looking at the top three sales quantity decisions, you may decide
to sell A units in Period 1, B units in Period 2 and C units in Period
3 from your purchases in Period 1. By doing so requires that you
purchase [A + B + C] units in Period 1.
o Looking at the bottom two sales quantity decisions, you may
decide to sell D units in Period 2, and E units in Period 3 from your
purchases in Period 2. By doing so requires that you purchase [D
+ E] units in Period 2.
o Note: The required input purchases to meet your sales obligations
per period can be automatically calculated for you when you click
on the grey Calculate Sum Button.
•

You will have 1 minute to make your sales quantity decisions.

•

After you and your other competitor have both made your respective
output decisions and both clicked on the red OK button located at the
bottom right of your screen, you both will observe the Market Summary
Screen for the trading round.

I) Trading Outcomes – Sales and Purchases
(Please refer to Figure 3 of the attachments: Market Summary Screen)
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•

You will keep this attachment for your reference throughout the
experiment today.

•

At the top of the screen denoted as SALES, you will observe your and
your competitor’s 5 sales quantity decisions.

•

At the bottom of each of the sales quantity decisions you will observe your
and your competitors’ total per period sales.

•

To the right you will observe the total required per period purchases that
you, your competitor, and the independent entity will have made to satisfy
all your sales quantity decisions.

J) Trading Outcomes – Market Outcomes - Quantities and Prices
•

In the middle of the screen denoted as MARKET OUTCOMES, you will
observe the Total Units Sold, as well as the corresponding Output Market
Price for each period.

•

Corresponding to the Total Units Sold is the Total Units Purchased, as well
as the corresponding Input Market Price for each period.

•

NOTE: Total units purchased in period 1 include the purchases of the
independent entity.

•

Also NOTE: The Output and Input Market Prices are derived from the
respective Period Output Demand and Input Supply Schedules provided to
you in figure 1.
•

Each Period’s Output Market Price = 100 – Total Units Sold.

•

Period 1 Input Market Price = Total Units Purchased.

•

Period 2 Input Market Price = 25 + Total Units Purchased.
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•

Therefore, i) Input Market Prices are determined based on how much
you, your competitor and independent entity purchase in each period, ii)
Output Market Prices are determined based on how much you and your
competitor sell in each period.

•

REMEMBER: The independent entity does not sell in competition with
you and your competitor in period 3.
Graphical Example – Period 1 – Figure 1
•

Assume you and your competitor together purchased 60 total units
in period 1.

•

Government Algorithm: 1053 tokens = the increase Q multiplied
by the increase in P.

•

This result in an additional 14 units purchased by the independent
entity for sale to consumers that cannot afford to purchase the
output from two traders in period 3.

•

This would result in a Period 1 Input Market Price of 74 tokens
= 60 + 14 units.

•

Assume you and your competitor together sold a total 30 units out
of 60 units of Period 1’s purchases in Period 1 and carried over the
rest for sale in later periods. This results in Output Market Price
of 70 tokens = 100 - 30 units.
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•

Market Output Demand Schedule

NOTE: In the graph above, if the competitors total input choice in
period one results in an intital (in absence of the independent
entity) input market price (dotted red lines), then the independent
entity chooses the quantity that exhausts its 1053 token budget.
This results in period one total input purchases and final (with the
presence of the independent entity) market price represented by the
blue dotted lines.

•

NOTE: However, as displayed in the figure below if the
competitors total input choice were smaller than in the previous
example, then the independent entity will be able to purchase more
inputs given its 1053 token budget. This is because the intial (in
absence of the independent entity) input market price would be
smaller than in the previous example.
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Graphical Example – Period 2 – Figure 1
•

Assume you and your competitor together purchased 50 total units
in period 2. This would result in a Period 2 Input Market Price of
75 tokens = 25 + 50 units.

•

Assume you and your competitor together sold a total of 30 units;
10 units of the Period 1’s purchases and 20 units of Period 2’s
purchases. This would result in a Period 2 Output Market Price
of 70 tokens = 100 - 30 units.
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Graphical Example – Period 3 – Figure 1
•

In all a total of 25 + 25 = 50 units will be carried forward and sold
in Period 3 resulting in an Output Market Price of 50 tokens =
100 - 50 units.

•

This leaves 50 – 20 = 30 units of Period 2’s purchases to be sold in
Period 3 with an original Input Market Price of 75 tokens.

•

This leaves 60 – 40 = 20 units of Period 1’s purchases to be sold in
Period 3 with an original Input Market Price of 74 tokens, due
to the purchases of the independent entity.
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K) Trading Outcomes – Earnings
•

At the bottom of the screen denoted as EARNINGS, you will observe
your and your competitor’s per period and also your total earnings.

•

As you are trading for multiple rounds, your running balance is provided
for you.
(Please refer to the last page of the attachments: Payoff Formulas)

•

You will keep this attachment for your reference throughout the
experiment today.

•

You and your competitor’s per period earnings for each round of trading
are calculated by the formulas provided in the attachment.

K) Trading Outcomes – Earnings – Mathematical Representation
•

Your earnings are determined based on how much you, your competitor,
and the independent entity purchase in each period and how much you
and your competitor sell in each period.
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•

Assume each of the two competitors chose the following outputs
following the previous graphical Market Outcome example.
•

Period 1 Earnings = [15] *[70 – 74] = -60 tokens

•

Period 2 Earnings = [5] *[70 – 74] + [10] *[70 – 75] = -170
tokens

•

Period 3 Earnings= [10]*[50 – 74] + [15] *[50 – 75] = - 515
tokens

•
•

Total Round Earnings = -60 -170 – 515 = - 745 tokens

Trading Outcomes
(Please refer to figure 3 of the attachments: Market Summary Screen)

•

You will have 2 minutes to review the Market Summary Screen.

•

After you and your competitor have both reviewed the SALES,
MARKET OUTCOMES and EARNINGS and have both clicked on the
red OK button located at the bottom right, you will observe the Sales
Decision Screen for the next round of trading.
(Please refer to figure 2 of the attachments: Quantity Sales Decision
Screen)

L) Summary: Market Relationships
•

In short the important price and quantity relationships to keep in mind are
as follows.

•

In short the important price and quantity relationships in any given period
to keep in mind are as follows.
i. The more you sell, the more you must purchase.
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ii. The more you, your competitor and the independent entity
purchase, the higher the Market Input Price.
iii. The less you and your competitor purchase, the more the
independent entity purchases.
iv. The more you and your competitor sell, the lower the Market
Output Price.
v. The higher the Market Input Price in relation to a lower Market
Output Price, the lower the Earnings for both competitors.
vi. Again, Output and Input Market Prices, as well as Earnings are
determined based on how much you, your competitor, and the
independent entity purchase in each period and how much you
and your competitor sell in each period.

Any Questions?
•

Before we begin, let’s practice for 4 market rounds.

•

Please do not talk to other subjects during the experiment.

•

Please do not attempt to look at another subject’s screen.
NOTE: The practice rounds will not affect your earnings for the
experiment today.

•

I will now start the experiment please click on the green z-leaf
Icon.

•

You should see before you the Sales Decision Screen as in figure 2
of the attachments.

•

Please make your per period output choices and click the grey
calculate button to view the quantities you would purchase in
each period to satisfy your output choices.
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•

Click on the red OK button located at the bottom right of your
screen when you are satisfied with your output choices.

•

You should now see before you the Market Summary Screen as
in figure 3 of the attachments.

•

Please observe your and your randomly matched competitor’s
Sales decisions and review the resulting Market Outcomes and
Earnings.
•

Again, Figure 1 represents the market supply and demand
relationships in the experiment today.

•

After reviewing, please click on the red OK button located at the
bottom right of your screen to move to the next round.

•

Continue playing until all practice rounds are completed.

•

Remember:

Any Questions?

o The more you sell, the more you must purchase.
o The more you, your competitor and the independent entity
purchase, the higher the Market Input Price.
o The less you and your competitor purchase, the more the
independent entity purchases.
o The more you and your competitor sell, the lower the
Market Output Price.
o The higher the Market Input Price in relation to a lower
Market Output Price, the lower the Earnings for both
competitors.
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o Again, Output and Input Market Prices, as well as
Earnings are determined based on how much you, your
competitor, and the independent entity purchase in each
period and how much you and your competitor sell in
each period.
o Period 1 Earnings are related to sales of units purchased in
period1
o Period 2 Earnings are related to a summation of the sales of
units carried forward from period 1 and the sales of units
purchased in period 2
o Period 3 Earnings are related to a summation of the sales of
units carried forward from periods 1 and 2.
•

Please do not talk to other subjects during the experiment.

•

Please do not attempt to look at another subject’s screen.

•

Please understand there are no wrong or right decisions, only those
that you believe are in your best interest.
Let’s Begin!



Start the relevant Treatment Program



Follow previous steps of starting the experiment
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ATTACHMENTS PROVIDED TO SUBJECTS
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Figure B.1

Market Output Demand and Input Provider Market Schedules Per Period
for a Single Trading Round
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Figure B.2

Quantity sales decision screen
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Figure B.3

Market summary screen
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Figure B.4

Payoff formulas
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Protocol Title: An Evaluation of Strategies to Smooth Inter-seasonal Maize Price Variability in Malawi: An
Experimental Approach
Protocol Number: 15-137
Principal Investigator: Mr. Chimwemwe Khoswe
Date of Determination: 5/4/2015
Qualifying Exempt Category: 45 CFR 46.101(b) (2)
Attachments: 15-137 - Stamped IC (in follow up email)
Dear Mr. Khoswe:
The Human Research Protection Program has determined the above referenced project exempt from IRB
review.
Please note the following:

 Retain a copy of this correspondence for your records.
 An approval stamp is required on all informed consents. You must use the stamped consent form
for obtaining consent from participants.

 Only the MSU staff and students named on the application are approved as MSU investigators
and/or key personnel for this study.

 The approved study will expire on 8/25/2017, which ! was the completion date indicated on your

application. If additional time is needed, submit a continuation request. (SOP 01-07 Continuing
Review of Approved Applications)

 Any modifications to the project must be reviewed and approved by the HRPP prior to

implementation. Any failure to adhere to the approved protocol could result in suspension or
termination of your project.

 Per university requirement, all research-related records (e.g. application materials, letters of

support, signed consent forms, etc.) must be retained and available for audit for a period of at
least 3 years after the research has ended.

 It is the responsibility of the investigator to promptly report events that may represent unanticipated
problems involving risks to subjects or others.

This determination is issued under the Mississippi State University's OHRP Federalwide Assurance
#FWA00000203. All forms and procedures can be found o! n the HRPP website: www.orc.msstate.edu.
Thank you for your cooperation and good luck to you in conducting this research project. If you have
questions or concerns, please contact me at kmyhand@orc.msstate.edu or call 662-325-3294.
Finally, we would greatly appreciate your feedback on the HRPP approval process. Please take a few
minutes to complete our survey athttps://www.surveymonkey.com/s/PPM2FBP.
Sincerely,
Katie Myhand
Assistant Compliance Administrator
cc: Kalyn T. Coatney, Advisor
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The committee required a small change in the title of the study as such a change
was effected in the title by changing the word “inter-seasonal” to “intra-seasonal”.
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